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 1 
Introduction: 
 The Arab Spring has had noticeable effects on twelve countries spanning from within 
North Africa to the Middle East including: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman and Kuwait. Not only did the movement spark riots and 
protests, but the events also led to reforms in government and the removal of oppressive tyrants 
in countries like Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Egypt. There are theories as to why the reactions in 
certain countries, like the aforementioned, were intensified in comparison to those with less 
political and social upheaval, like in Bahrain, Kuwait or Jordan.1 Many authors suggest the 
intensity of uprisings is dependent upon these underlying factors: economic hardship, 
government corruption, and inflation of social media outlets like Twitter or Facebook. However, 
other social scientists deeply consider the youth bulge, disenfranchisement of religious sects, 
tribal differences, rising unemployment, and the use of technology as a uniting tool as factors of 
the Arab Spring. Other authors similarly attribute the Arab Spring to intertwined causes of 
economic, social, political, juridical, and diplomatic problems that all contributed to the massive 
uprisings and revolution that became the Arab Spring.2 In addition to these disparities, the 
Middle East lacked institutions willing to invest in the education and progress of the Arab-youth. 
The majority of investments made by Western countries centered on oil, gas, and other economic 
gains.3 If these factors are indeed the root of the revolutions and sequence of events that we 
recognize as the Arab Spring, there are a few lingering questions that this paper aims to address. 
 This paper will explore and evaluate how the Arab Spring took hold in certain countries 
and the reasons it did not have as grand of an effect in others. Moreover, this paper will move to 
                                                1	Anderson,	Lisa.	"Demystifying	the	Arab	Spring:	Parsing	the	Differences	Between	Tunisia,	Egypt,	and	Libya."	Foreign	Affairs	90,	no.	3	(2011):	2-7.		2	Pollack,	Kenneth	M.,	Byman,	Daniel	L.,	and	Al-Turk,	Akram.	2011.	The	Arab	Awakening	:	America	and	the	Transformation	of	the	Middle	East	(1).	New	York,	NY,	US:	Brookings	Institution	Press.	3	Pollack	and	Byman	and	Al-Turk,	“The	Arab	Awakening.”	
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evaluate the cross-national similarities and political patterns of those nations with Eritrea, 
specifically why the Arab Spring failed to lead to shifting Eritrea’s political climate. Lastly, I 
will investigate the possibilities of what Eritrea would have needed to successfully achieve 
variant levels of success, as the twelve countries most affected by the Arab Spring. In order to 
discover these possibilities, there will be research covering what Eritrea uses as its main 
mediums of suppression and how they relate to the Arab countries. 
 The paper itself is split into three sections beginning with a chapter that defines the Arab 
Spring, then moves into exploring the specific countries involved by comparing how far the 
methods of revolt progressed in a cross-national analysis. This includes the brief history of the 
North African and Middle Eastern countries most affected by the series of uprisings and political 
dissent. In evaluating each nation and research conducted through peer-reviewed journal articles, 
accredited scholarship and drawing comparisons through the cross-national chart, the chapter 
will explain why the Arab Spring succeeded where it did, and inversely why it was not as 
successful elsewhere.  
 The second chapter will study the origins of Eritrea from colonial rule to liberation to the 
modern state and investigate the distribution of power or lack of that keeps the government 
centralized. In doing so, this section will highlight how the government has risen to power from 
its former liberation guerrilla army and how the prohibition of separate political parties has 
allowed the standing government’s domination over all sectors engulfing public life. This 
includes socially conforming citizens to continue the legacies of the culture that existed prior to 
liberation, which will be discussed in the “Nakfa Principles.” This lens into Eritrea’s 
governmental structure will address the infamous conscription, otherwise known as national 
service, and how legislation has cemented its role in the lives of Eritrean citizens through the 
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Yikaelo-Warsay Campaign. While examining the logistics of conscription, this chapter aims to 
address how service has been framed as an inescapable and inherent civic duty of each citizen, 
and offers a cross-national comparative chart with the twelve Arab-speaking nations involved in 
the Arab Uprisings to provide an analyzing lens into the use of conscription in these 
administrations and how those that implement the practice closely resemble authoritarian 
regimes. In addition, this chapter will emphasize the root of Eritrea’s refugee exodus, which is 
overwhelmingly composed of the youth, and contrast who remains in Eritrea and the relevance 
of the remaining vulnerable population with the population that was able to incite dissent and 
peaceful protests within the Arab nations. Furthermore, this chapter will make the argument for 
why Eritrea is in fact comparable to its regional counterparts through the discussion of its shared 
religions, languages, lack of pluralism, multi-ethnic composition, social, economic and political 
characteristics. All in all, this chapter will strengthen the link between Eritrea with its North 
African counterparts as opposed to homogenizing it with the entirety of the Middle East.  
 The third and final chapter will discuss the main mediums of suppression in Eritrea and 
how the government has ultimately secured its power against any internal resistance, 
consequently discouraging organized opposition or vocalized dissidents within its borders. To do 
so, the chapter will research Eritrea’s policies and implementations surrounding freedom of 
religion, freedom of independent press, freedom of assembly, the role of civil society, and the 
freedom of Eritreans to enter and exit the country and provide detailed case study of the ‘G-15’, 
and examples of what repercussions citizens face when violating the societal norms of the 
aforementioned categories. Why does this matter? By highlighting the level of scrutiny that 
ordinary citizens face when expressing personal liberties and human rights as those mentioned 
above, the nature of a government is exposed and the more restrictive, the more likely the 
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government is acting as an authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Eritrea’s governance is relevant in 
comparison to those of the Arab Spring because authoritarian regimes and lack of good 
governance played significant roles in fueling the organized civil social and political upheaval 
observed in North Africa and the Middle East starting in 2011.  
 This final chapter will also address why political or social upheaval regarding Eritrea is 
produced amongst the Eritrean diaspora and expatriates. What are the lengths of censorship and 
why is there no scholarship available regarding opposing views within Eritrea’s borders? Why is 
this relevant to the Arab Spring? There are many arguments for why the Arab Spring has 
occurred and who it has affected but scholars have failed to draw the link between countries that 
are experiencing similar or worse conditions and this is reflected in the case of Eritrea. This 
chapter aims to examine Eritrea leading up to the Arab Spring and adequately address the 
underlying reasons that Eritrea has not faced a revolution since its independence. Eritrea is an 
anomaly amongst the countries in the Horn of Africa, from enduring a 30 years-long war for 
liberation with Ethiopia after previously being subjected to a sequence of Ottoman, British, 
Egyptian, Italian rule – to being ruled by the same administrator and overseer for over 25 years. 
It is imperative that these connections are made exposing how open political thought and speech 
are restricted in less-democratic nations and the significance that censorship has in both the Arab 
nations and Eritrea. Eritrea was born through struggle but more importantly, its citizens 
demanded freedom from their oppressors and sought a nation that was ultimately freer and 
centered on unity through a shared national identity. Similarly, the Arab nations hoping to form 
alternative political systems that would stabilize basic human rights, lessen censorship, seek 
democracy while upholding individual freedoms were the same countries that participated in the 
Arab Uprisings. 
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 This paper argues the underlying reasons that Eritrea has been unable to participate in the 
Arab Spring, starting with its notorious military conscription or national service program, 
fastening what is left of Eritrea’s youth and simultaneously sparking the refugee exodus from 
Eritrea. In addition to providing insight into why Eritrea’s population is diminishing, this paper 
will make the argument that the citizens’ fear of punishment has sparked self-censorship and 
distrust that was not as widespread in its Arab counterparts that experienced neighboring 
populations engulfed in similar uprisings, disrupting the systems of oppressions in place. These 
arguments aim to raise awareness of Eritrea’s political climate and how it has been stunted in its 
transition towards democracy.  
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Chapter 1: 
 This chapter will argue what the major drivers of the Arab Spring were. It will prove that 
the uniting factor of the Arabs fighting against their governments was the desire for freedom and 
the hope to finally escape the cycle of authoritarian rulers. There is a glamorized role associated 
with the social media and simultaneous youth bulge within the respective countries involved. 
These Arab-speaking nations had revolutions that were able to happen because of the resources 
and varying intense relations between citizens and their government.  In certain countries like 
Algeria and Saudi Arabia, the regimes could be united under a strong central government. In 
more destabilized countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, they were less centralized and unable 
to unite under a stable government. In many countries, revolutions are unable to happen because 
of the tight control and strict enforcement of the government. But what happens when there is 
instability and unrest? When the government and the people cannot see eye to eye? When the 
people’s desires are unfulfilled by the government and the people demand change? The 
outcomes of the nations involved in the Arab Uprisings were unexpected and this section will 
evaluate each respective nation’s experience in depth to better understand their outcomes. 
Additionally, this section will argue that the Arab Spring was a compilation of organized 
political and social responses whose outcomes were largely shaped by each government’s 
restrictions of personal and civil liberties in each local context. The countries that failed to 
remove their dictators and were quickly silenced are the same nations that experienced heavy 
online censorship, a lack of multiple political parties and assemblies, as well as comparatively 
wealthier economies with rulers that were able to manipulate appeasing legislation for their 
constituents. The countries that successfully removed their heads of state experienced similar 
suppressions of political and individual rights; however, the aforementioned countries had poorer 
Mehari 
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economies and their governments were prone to turmoil as a result of disintegration with other 
forms of authority, not limited to the military and security apparatus. This paper will not predict 
what the Arab countries that did not successfully revolt needed to reach change, but instead, it 
aims to address misconceptions of what led to the successes and failures in each nation involved 
and why understanding the multiple mediums of suppression involved is relevant. 
What is the Arab Spring? 
 Scholars have observed the slue of Arab uprisings that began in 2011 and have received a 
spectrum of names, ranging from: the Arab Spring, Arab Uprisings, Arab Upheavals, Arab 
Awakening, etc. Some scholars separate each country’s experience, i.e.: Tunisia’s Uprisings, 
Egypt’s Uprisings, etc. This paper will refer to the culmination of events that transpired in North 
Africa and subsequently, the Middle East as “The Arab Spring” and “The Arab Uprisings”, 
interchangeably. Much like author Kamal Eldin Osman Salih, this paper aims to delve deeper 
into what connects the events that transpired throughout the Arab world: “The Arab uprisings 
represent a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that swept the Arab world.”4 
Although this definition Salih gives explains the experience of the collectivity of countries 
involved, it falls short of explaining what linked the revolutions and uprisings, along with what 
sustained the events in each various local context or country. However, Salih goes further to link 
the protests in these Arab countries through their use of the same techniques of resistance, which 
included strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies. A big source of contention has been the 
role and influence of social media throughout the Arab Spring. “Particularly pivotal to protest 
process as well has been the use of social media to organize, communicate, raise awareness, and 
issue danger alerts among the thousands of protestors in the face of state attempts at repression, 
                                                4	Osman	Salih,	Kamal	Eldin.	2013.	"THE	ROOTS	AND	CAUSES	OF	THE	2011	ARAB	UPRISINGS."	Arab	Studies	
Quarterly	35,	no.	2:	184-206.	Religion	and	Philosophy	Collection.	
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internet censorship, crowd control and even physical attack…”5 Social media served as a vehicle 
for communication; however, the methods and forums used in each country varied based on the 
events that needed publicity or in certain situations, warnings. In order to grasp how instrumental 
these tools were, the importance of the various local contexts arises, requiring one to deconstruct 
what events shaped the country and inhabitants’ relationship with certain media. Not only have 
the demonstrators and countries involved in the Arab Spring been linked by their techniques and 
risk of penalty, but they also shared a uniform slogan in such a time of despair and revolution. 
The people in the streets would yell, “Ash-sha’b yurid isqat an-nizam: The people want to bring 
down the regime.”6 There were clear levels of contempt that fueled these uprisings until regimes 
were either dismantled or even more suppressive of their citizens, which is why it is necessary to 
define what rights were accessible in each nation. 
 Another trait that unified the people who fought in the streets and against the corrupt 
regimes was the respect of religion. The countries within North Africa and the Middle East have 
largely been connected through the recognition of a shared religion: Islam; however, there are 
Christian and other religious minorities that exist within these areas. Although not all religious, 
the people organized what would be known as “the largest, most organized demonstrations” as 
the “days of rage” and these would take place on Fridays after Juma, otherwise known as 
afternoon Friday prayer.7 However, just as one is able to observe these similarities, it is 
important that scholars understand and respect the differences each country faced in its 
opposition’s attempt to attain justice and a change in government, which is why some scholars 
refrain from referring to the period of regional unrest as the Arab Spring. In a comparison to the 
European revolutions of 1848, Anne Applebaum writes: 
                                                5	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	6	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	7	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	
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Each revolution must be assessed in its own context, each had a distinctive 
impact. The revolutions spread from one point to another. They interacted 
to a limited extent. … The drama of each revolution unfolded separately. 
Each had its own heroes, its own crisis. Each therefore demands its own 
narrative.8 (185) 
 
While the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya each navigated through a change or resignation in 
leadership in varying ways, one can conclude that Tunisia was the catalyst for the entirety of the 
Arab Uprisings and it is pivotal to understanding the latter rebellious movements. Applebaum 
referenced this excerpt from a text focusing on the European revolutions of 1848 to highlight the 
state of despair reflected in what has garnered global attention – a “complicated and messy” 
situation that so closely mirrors history. This excerpt also goes to provide the counterargument as 
to why there is a divide amongst scholars that recognize the regional unrest as combined or 
interlaced events versus those that recognize each instance within each respective nation 
separately. Salih compares scholars like Anne Applebaum and Mohammed Farazmand’s 
interpretations and analysis of the Arab uprisings to provide a holistic lens as to the new Arab 
identity that has emerged amongst those in the Middle East and North Africa. Salih examines 
Mohammed Farazmand’s article “The Nature of 2011 Arab Uprisings: A Comparative Analysis” 
claiming “a new Arab political identity with an anti-despotic, pluralist and democracy-seeking 
approach is dawning.”9 Spectators, news outlets, and the West have observed these 
developments that grew out of the Arab Uprisings, often witnessing a clear divide between the 
elites in Arab nations and the overwhelming youth population that is far more disadvantaged 
than the former. 
                                                8	Applebaum,	Anne.	2011.	"The	Arab	Revolutions	of	2011	are	more	like	Europe	in	1848,	not	1989,"	Slate,	accessed	April	26,	2017.	http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2011/02/every_revolution_is_different.html.	9	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	
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 Although several social scientists accredit the build up of these events to the influx of 
economic hardship, government corruption, suppression of individual liberties, and overall 
disenfranchisement, considering the population within the Arab-speaking nations that were the 
most impacted is critical for painting the framework of why these events took place and what 
unites them. Not only was the distinction between the elites and youth during this time clear, but 
as was the ongoing accumulation of wealth by the elites in contrast with the continual cycle of 
unemployment and borderline poverty for the Arab youth who were the majority in their 
homelands. The ruling elites obtained security through corruption, and they also made sure to 
find ways to ensure the continuity of their legacies through nepotism and brute force. These 
illegitimate regimes continued the practices of “…adopted policies that consolidate absolute rule, 
pave the way for succession within the family framework, and secure in a systematic way 
economic and social discrimination as well as political exclusion along ethnic and sectarian 
lines.”10 Similar to other forms of patronage or the spoil system that was formerly used in the 
United States, the regimes of Algeria, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other nations where the line of 
power has been retained within family lineage has made it easier for these same governments to 
remain in power in the midst of arising crises. These same members of the ruling class and social 
elites have been able to endure financial and economic instability that handicaps the lower 
classes and the unemployed as the former have already secured stability and securitization 
through the governments they choose to support. The demographic build up of these countries 
are not majority elite, they are in fact disproportionately composed of disenfranchised youth that 
struggle to survive in the midst of programs sponsored by international financial institutions like 
the IMF or the World Bank. These same international institutions impose “economic 
liberalization programs” such as the “Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)” that allow the 
                                                10	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	
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government to halt subsidies that had previously been offered to those with lower incomes within 
their nations, and consequently, the same citizens that make up the majority of the populations 
are the same ones who are unable to afford common goods and foods in the midst of staggering 
rises in food prices. This has been observed as especially common amongst the youth, which 
have been credited at the forefronts of many of the nations that participated in the Arab 
Uprisings. In the midst of this argument, it is relevant that scholar Salih acknowledges the youth 
as “…the youth below age 25 who represent approximately 65 percent of the total population of 
the Arab world.”11 There are shared lived experiences and cultural practices that existed prior to 
the emergence of a “new Arab political identity” which continues to unite those in the Middle 
East and North Africa, not limited to shared religions, languages, ethnic groups, and outcomes of 
government interactions with more developed nations in the West that base policies around 
furthering economic and political priorities.  
What was different in North Africa? 
 When the Arab Uprisings began, the governments of Tunisia and Egypt collapsed much 
quicker than Libya or Yemen. Tunisia and Egypt were both heavily military operated states, and 
when the militaries shifted to supporting the uprisings instead of the rulers of the regimes, there 
were vigorous changes that counteracted the powers held by the former presidents in Tunisia and 
Egypt. Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak both minimized the 
military’s level of control and political status as well as appointing businessmen and government 
officials, otherwise known as elites, to positions that would inevitably neutralize each nation’s 
military.12 In the case of Libya, the uprisings were not as swift as Tunisia and Egypt, especially 
as it garnered international attention and interventions. The ruling class went as far as hiring 
                                                11	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	12	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	
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African mercenaries that were provided by Israel13, which only heightened the atrocities 
committed under the Gaddafi regime. Each of the leaders of these nations received varying levels 
of support or resilience from their militaries and neighboring countries, which in turn affected 
the duration of the revolutions.  
 The next country to successfully remove its dictator was Libya; however, Libya’s 
political climate and tribal divisions varied from those of Tunisia or Egypt. In regard to Libya, 
the mass mobilization of civilians who were from the west, Cyrenaica, and the east, Tripolitania, 
had varying responses to the protests and if they would remain loyal to Muammar Gaddafi.14 
Whereas in Egypt and Tunisia, there was not a substantial number within an elite class [willing] 
to support the dictators, like in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or even Libya. A notable difference in the 
case of protest in Libya is that the major protest in Benghazi resulted in the Libyan army opening 
fire on its disgruntled citizens. The brute actions of Libya’s government triggered a response 
from Western powers as a broad international effort, specifically the United States and NATO 
members, interfered and led a military intervention. The 6-7 month conflict led to the death of 
former leader Muammar Gaddafi, and yet another removal of leadership amongst the Arab 
nations in North Africa.  
 Although the immolation in Tunisia is considered the impetus of the Arab Spring, the 
outrage and consistent neglect of the country’s overwhelmingly rural inhabitants fueled the 
widespread demonstrations. In fact, it was the organized labor movement that resonated with the 
youth decades later. The levels of corruption in Tunisia were evident by the infamous network 
known as “the Family” in Tunisia. “The Family” referred to “…more than half of Tunisia’s 
commercial elites that were personally related to Ben Ali through his three adult children, seven 
                                                13	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	14	Pollack	and	Byman	and	Al-Turk,	“The	Arab	Awakening.”	
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siblings, and second wife’s ten brothers and sisters”15. Besides the transparent patronage that 
allowed the benefits of the ruling class to be shared amongst themselves, the rest of Tunisia had 
still been grappling with the lack of resources they had been receiving. Contrary to the 
experiences in Libya and Egypt, Tunisia’s revolution did not rely heavily on the interaction with 
its military. 16 As the first country to experience uprisings, Tunisia’s experience was far more 
disorganized and sporadic; although, the repeated strikes of the labor movement solidified how 
instrumental the strikes were in fueling the protests to come.  
 Tunisia had been a popular travel destination, manipulated by the government to present 
a façade of a tourist-friendly country that was sustainable, but this only added fuel to the groups 
that were organizing revolts. Namely, the Islamists within Tunisia that unified masses under 
religion shouted claims that the government was essentially “prostituting the country for foreign 
exchange….”17 It is indicative that the religious extremists were able to garner support amongst 
locals against the unfavorable tourism and rapidly expanding Western interactions. Tunisia, 
however, is just one of the African countries that was able to incite a successful rebellion. The 
uproar was a unified response to the myriad of restrictions on civil liberties, imprisonment of 
political activists and journalists, limited academic freedom, and poor governance. The lack of a 
centralized government benefitted the protesters in the midst of the wave of anti-despotic 
uprisings while illuminating the divergent economic reservations of Tunisians in comparison to 
their regional counterparts in Egypt and Libya.  
 When observing Morocco, the legitimacy held by the state is a direct result of the 
relationship of the King with God and the State of Morocco. In fact, Larbi Sadiki writes in depth 
                                                15	Anderson,	Lisa.	2011.	"Demystifying	the	Arab	Spring:	Parsing	the	Differences	Between	Tunisia,	Egypt,	and	Libya."	Foreign	Affairs,	2011.	2.		16	Anderson,	“Demystifying”.	17	Anderson,	“Demystifying”.		
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covering the interconnected relationship that King Mohammed is able to maintain. Sadiki’s 
article deconstructs the power levels and relationship between authority and citizens throughout 
North Africa. Specifically, he refers to Morocco as having a “holy trinity”18. “The King, referred 
to as the “Commander of the faithful” because of the claim that he is a direct descendent of the 
Prophet of Islam. This gives him legitimacy…”19 Sadiki’s claims indicate that the citizens of 
Morocco prioritize the hierarchy of religion within society above all else. Furthermore, he is 
equating the obedience to the authoritarian ruler to an innate submission to Islam or Allah. He 
writes, “Hence, the king occupies a distinctive position within the Moroccan political system and 
any dissent or questioning of the king’s authority is by implication a reject of Islam and may be 
considered treason.”20 There is no other king or monarch or dictator that reigned during the 
uprisings that began in 2011, who has linked his lineage to the Prophet of Islam, Prophet 
Mohammed. Although, the rigid force of assuming one’s self innately related to an idol is a 
manipulation of ideology that has maintained the highest level of rule observed in Morocco. 
These claims scratch the surface of why Morocco’s experience was vastly incomparable to those 
of its rebelling neighbors. The experiences of monarchial Arab regimes included collectively 
resisting opposition through strong political, military and economic union – which explains why 
countries like Morocco and Jordan were invited to join the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC).21 Those who are able to make the necessary changes to survive and thrive in rapidly 
changing conditions are the same ones who are able to prosper. This is an accessible advantage 
to the ones making the changes to the systems of oppression at hand.  
                                                18	Sadiki,	Larbi,	and	Youcef	Bouandel.	2016.	"The	Post	Arab	Spring	Reform:	The	Maghreb	at	a	Cross	Roads."	
DOMES:	Digest	Of	Middle	East	Studies	25,	no.	1:	109-131.	19	Sadiki	and	Bouandel,	“Post	Arab	Spring”,	109-131.	20	Sadiki	and	Bouandel,	“Post	Arab	Spring”,	109-131.	21	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	
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 During the Arab Spring, King Mohammed VI of Morocco made sure to implement 
reforms that appeared prudent, yet they were acts to ensure he would still hold power. For 
instance, Sadiki’s text aims to reveal that King Mohammed VI instigated a somewhat quasi 
revolution, which entailed redistributing roles of power and authority within the government to 
the members of the traditional opposition.22 The people of Morocco had not led the same levels 
of protests and outcries for a change in leadership, but the King responded proactively to the 
rising levels of disdain amongst the citizens by offering an appeasing resolution – reformation 
within the government and limiting some of his powers by appointing a prime minister.23 
Through this same lens of manipulation, King Mohammad VI was also able to reconstruct the 
present norms of how individuals or officials engage in politics by redefining the positions 
within his administration and using this as a pretext for further legitimizing the state of Morocco. 
Therefore, Sadiki describes King Mohamed VI’s influences in Morocco as a “fulcrum of 
power”24. The King was strategic in distancing himself and his policies from those of his 
predecessor and father, Hassan II, who has been accused of human rights abuses.25 Religion is 
not the definitive answer for why Moroccans did not revolt to the same extent as their neighbors, 
but it begins to illuminate how pervasive the manipulation of religion can be in demanding 
submission from a ruler’s people – take into account August 21 in Tunisia26. The state 
discourages social and religious diversity by reinforcing religious policies such as passing 
legislation that mandates the Ramadan fast for Muslims.27 The people of Morocco did not 
demand their king step down like their neighbors in Tunisia and Egypt; instead they demanded 
                                                22	Salih,	“Roots	and	Causes”,	184-206.	23	“Arab	uprising:	Country	by	country	–	Morocco,”	BBC	News,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482680.	24	“Arab	uprising:	Country	by	country	–	Morocco.”		25	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Morocco,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/morocco.		26	Mohammed’s	birthday	on	August	21	is	regarded	as	a	public	holiday	in	Morocco.	27	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Morocco.”	
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reforms in policies and governmental positions of power. Despite the restrictions, comparatively, 
Moroccans enjoyed a freer society than their regional counterparts. In Saudi Arabia, there is also 
enforcement of a similar Ramadan policy; however, this policy is indiscriminate, imposed upon 
Muslims and non-Muslims. 
 Much like Morocco, Algeria also resumed with its head of state. The cries for abdication 
and regime change were faint at best, as the citizens had been appeased through false promises of 
reformations as well as economic stimulants. Algeria is one of the richest countries in North 
Africa, and holds more legitimacy than many of its counterparts because of it is perceived as 
more “democratic” by comparison.28 Algeria used parliamentary elections to maintain its 
legitimacy, while many of its neighbors lacked similar procedures in the period leading up to the 
regional unrest. Within North Africa, rulers of oppressive authoritarian regimes enraged their 
citizens. Algeria had been an exceptional case because it had become clear that the people were 
not rallying for a change in government, rather reparations made to the economy and government 
subsidies that would allow locals the ability to acquire subsidized staple goods.29 According to 
Louisa Dris-Alt Hamadouche, the government’s announcements of reversals of price increases 
and new policies designed to lower the costs of food imports met protesters’ demands and 
resulted in the loss of momentum for mass public disobedience and protests. This strategic policy 
implementation mirrors the Moroccan government’s eager response in repressing and diluting 
dissidence, and in the case of Algeria, it was successful in maintaining the rigged elections that 
the government promoted as fair and free.   
 Historically, Algeria has faced a history of harsh police brutality in response to organized 
protests, like during the October 1988 riots in which security forces and the army fired live 
                                                28	Sadiki	and	Bouandel,	“Post	Arab	Spring”,	109-131.	29	Volpi,	Frédéric.	2013.	"Algeria	versus	the	Arab	Spring."	Journal	Of	Democracy	24,	no.	3:	104-115.	
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ammunition at the crowds. When the events in Tunisia sparked revolutions that motivated youth 
and dissidents across borders, one of the overwhelming fears had been the cries for government 
reform and impeachment. Algeria’s circumstances are especially unique under President 
Bouteflika, because the government and the people repeated the relationship of obedience and 
submission in exchange for improving social and economic needs. Hamadouche writes of the 
understood traditional social contract that had been imposed and normalized by the Algerian 
regime: “The administration provides better socioeconomic conditions in exchange for 
continuing (albeit grudging) political quiescence.”30 It could also be argued that much of 
Algeria’s population had not been prepared to have a full-blown revolution because of the fear of 
failed socio-political uprisings, like the October riots, or merely having been accustomed to 
reforms in response to complaints or in the midst of outrage. 
 In the midst of the 2011 uprisings, Algeria’s government had been involved in many 
forms of censorship, including: media censorship through blocking websites deemed “contrary to 
the public order or decency”; outlawing unapproved political parties (approved by the Ministry 
of the Interior); using criminal defamation laws to pressure independent newspapers; blocking 
radio stations; and explicitly blocking political parties’ website.31 The state was guilty of 
restricting religion, as non-Muslims may only gather to worship at state-approved locations as 
well as benefitting specific ethnic groups. Algeria is multiethnic consisting of Arabs and Berbers, 
yet the majority of elites consisted of Arabs and there was no national recognition of the Berbers’ 
cultural language which stifled their social and political mobility.32   
                                                30	Volpi,	"Algeria	versus	the	Arab	Spring",	104-115.	31	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Algeria,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/algeria.		32	Fromherz,	Allen.	2014.	"Between	Springs:	The	Berber	Dilemma."	Muslim	World	104,	no.	3:	240-249.	
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 Unlike Tunisia’s rural inhabitants, the demographics of those protesting in Egypt were 
youth from urban and cosmopolitan areas. While Hosni Mubarak reigned, he was unable to 
provide the people with basic services and unable to stimulate the economy, thus leaving tens of 
millions of Egyptians to the widespread unemployment and poverty that began to unite citizens. 
Egypt’s military has always held enormous influence in the country and the revolutions only 
illuminated its presence. Egypt’s government structure and implemented programs were unique 
in comparison to its North African counterparts. In fact, in the case of Egypt, one could observe 
how integrated Internet had become in society, as a result of information and communication 
technology (ICT) being introduced through the government, private sector, and civil society, 
which wholesomely formed public private partnership.33 The intended purpose of introducing 
ICT into Egyptian society was to bolster socioeconomic development, which could 
simultaneously progress living conditions within the nation and afford citizens of all 
backgrounds the luxury of access. A utopian and progressive proposal, unfortunately, the 
implementation of these programs indicated a clear divide between the youth and older 
generations. The introduction of ICT in Egypt illustrates the differences in government programs 
and intentions within North Africa, as Egypt sought for a literate, urban and technocratic system 
– which was not necessarily the same for the rest of its Arab counterparts. Throughout history, 
Egypt has been the hub for the exchange of media and culture entering the Middle East and even 
serves as a passage to the Middle East from North Africa, as visible by what has been exploited 
for capital, like the Suez Canal. Although the country’s leadership shifted from it’s the dictator 
Hosni Mubarak to the Muslim Brotherhood and then a primarily military autocracy, Egypt’s 
civilians were still able to remove a monolithic regime in hopes of change. The Freedom House 
                                                33	Kamel,	Sherif	H.	2014.	"Egypt's	Ongoing	Uprising	and	the	Role	of	Social	Media:	Is	there	Development?."	
Information	Technology	For	Development	20,	no.	1:	78-91.		
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reports that the Egyptian government suppressed the freedom of assembly and denied the right to 
free and fair trials by banning the Muslim Brotherhood from previous elections that had been 
postponed. Academic freedom was limited and media works had been subject to censorship if 
deemed contrary to Islam or harmful to the country’s reputation.34 
 In order to further understand the role of social media within the 2011 uprisings, it is 
imperative that its uses and benefits served are clearly defined. In the context of Egypt, scholar 
Sherif H. Kamel argues, “Facebook was used mainly to exchange excessive audiovisual 
content… Twitter was used for logistical purposes on where to meet, what to avoid and how to 
deal with tear gas among other uses…YouTube was instrumental in documenting all sorts of 
developments…”35 However, the Arab Spring has linked several countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa despite scholars identifying contesting causes for the political uprisings. The 
media has often oversimplified these series of events as the “Facebook Revolution” or the 
“Twitter Revolution”; yet, failed to prove a significant correlation as to why one should credit 
massive political rebellions and mobilized persons to social media. According to Gadi Wolfsfeld, 
a cross-cultural comparison that follows the politics-media-politics (PMP) principle36 prioritizes 
the political environment to be followed or sparking a presence of social media – which acts as a 
facilitator in the midst of rapidly changing political climates, to engage and potentially lead to 
further political changes in a political environment. This is a worthwhile argument as it negates 
the misconception that these uprisings within the Arab Spring occurred merely as a result of 
social media interference, when in fact, all of the countries involved, especially those that 
                                                34	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Egypt,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/egypt.		35	Kamel,	"Egypt's	Ongoing	Uprising”,	78-91.	36	This	principle	states	that	the	role	of	the	media	in	a	political	process	is	best	seen	as	a	cycle	in	which	changes	in	the	political	environment	lead	to	changes	in	media	performance,	which	leads	to	further	political	changes	in	the	political	environment.		
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resulted in high-conflict areas or removal of leadership, were suffering from economic hardships, 
volatility on the basis of inflation, long-standing grievances and rising levels of dissatisfaction 
with their respective governments37. Furthermore, the claims to social media’s influence can be 
described as crucial to communication or a vehicle of dissemination rather than the determinant 
of the events.  
 There are contesting perspectives on the value social media held during the Arab Spring, 
but the insight of those that resist its impact will be referred to as cyber-skeptics and those that 
defend its role as cyber-enthusiasts. “The cyber-skeptics downplay the significance of the new 
technology, arguing that using the Internet gives people a false sense of participation and keeps 
them from actual physical protesting.”38 Although technology alone cannot guarantee revolts and 
instantaneous government reforms, a counterargument to the views of the cyber-skeptics can 
challenge these claims based on how social media allows communication across myriad forums 
and the exchange of beneficial ideas that further organize and mobilize efforts. In fact, “The 
cyber-enthusiasts express optimism about the ability of the new media to empower people living 
in nondemocratic societies and to allow insurgents to adopt new strategies”39 Thus, scholars like 
Lisa Anderson argue that the way in which social media played a role in the midst of political 
upheaval was taking advantage of how technology resonated in various local contexts, spanning 
from Tunisia to Syria. For instance, the Gulf States that exhibited high levels of social media and 
low levels of protests were the inverse of Libya, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, which experienced 
lower levels of social media and higher levels of protest.40 However, scholars like Bellin assess 
the role of social media in countries like Egypt and Tunisia more reliant on four important 
                                                37	Wolfsfeld,	Gadi,	Elad	Segev,	and	Tamir	Sheafer.	2013.	"Social	Media	and	the	Arab	Spring:	Politics	Comes	First."	International	Journal	Of	Press/Politics	18,	no.	2:	115-137.		38	Wolfsfeld	and	Segev	and	Sheafer,	“Social	Media	and	the	Arab	Spring”,	115-137.	39	Wolfsfeld	and	Segev	and	Sheafer,	“Social	Media	and	the	Arab	Spring”,	115-137.	40	Wolfsfeld	and	Segev	and	Sheafer,	“Social	Media	and	the	Arab	Spring”,	115-137.	
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explanatory factors: long-standing grievances, an emotional trigger, a sense of impunity, and 
access to new social media.41 
 In the case of Tunisia, the final event that sparked the catalyst of full-blown protests and 
social dissent amongst the streets was the self-immolation of 26-year old street vendor Mohamed 
Bouazizi. Bouazizi was not the first to set himself ablaze, yet the public knows little of 
Abdesslem Trimech. Trimech’s immolation did not go viral, nor did it unite mass protestors as 
Bouazizi’s did when Al-Jazeera aired his footage on Facebook. This has become one of the 
crucial moments that led to collective action, enhanced by social media because if it weren’t for 
the publicity that led to longevity, the world may have never heard of Tunisia’s rebellions nor 
would the different regions been able to actively unite in protesting former Tunisian president 
Ben Ali.42 Wolfsfeld agrees that social media are important because they can provide 
information and images that motivate people, they allow groups to organize and mobilize much 
more efficiently than in the past, and they allow protestors to convey messages to the outside 
world. Figure 1 has been extracted from Byun and Hollander’s Explaining the Intensity of the 
Arab Spring: 
                                                41	Bellin,	E.	2012.	“Reconsidering	the	Robustness	of	Authoritarianism	in	the	Middle	East:	Lessons	from	the	Arab	Spring.”	Comparative	Politics	44	(2):	127—49	42	“How	Tunisia’s	revolution	began,”	Al	Jazeera,	accessed	on	April	26,	2017,	http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html.		
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Figure 1. Level of Unrest by Country. 43 
 Figure 1 depicts the varying levels of civil uprisings and the progressions experienced 
during the Arab Spring. The countries grouped together under each color experienced similar 
levels of social media usage as well as restrictions on civil and personal liberties. In the countries 
listed above, especially those that reached levels of militarization without regime removal like 
Bahrain and Syria, the role of social media had become especially relevant in broadcasting the 
atrocities experienced within a nation’s borders as well as in organizing participation.  
 The countries in the Persian Gulf had a relatively different experience than those in North 
Africa. Many of these countries, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain are wealthier states 
and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with governments that were able to 
quickly suppress dissidents, some transnationally. The members of the GCC were a part of the 
                                                43	Byun,	Chonghyun	Christie,	and	Ethan	J.	Hollander.	2015.	"Explaining	the	Intensity	of	the	Arab	Spring."	
DOMES:	Digest	Of	Middle	East	Studies	24,	no.	1:	26-46.	
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Peninsula Shield agreement, which aimed to maintain collective security in the region as a 
deterrent for international conflict. This treaty is noteworthy as it pertains to how countries in the 
region have decided to address events that happen within and outside of their boundaries.  
  In the case of Oman, the government quickly suppressed protestors and jailed activists 
and journalists that supported the attempts to revolt. Certain Gulf nations did not face nearly as 
much chaos as other Arab nations whose neighbors had been experiencing increasing violence. 
Oman is an absolute monarchy – similar to the authoritarian wield of its neighboring 
dictatorships. The Sultan of Oman holds absolute power as no political parties or organized 
opposition groups were allowed within the country.44 Thus, there were enforced limitations on 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly (which required official permission), online 
censorship, as well as government criticism allowed in Oman that led to self-censorship.45 In 
comparison to its neighbors involved in the Arab Spring, Oman exhibited serious levels of 
censorship, expected religious compliance and oppression that sparked its citizens’ outrage. 
 Kuwait experienced a fairly concealed series of protests and had not gained much 
attention in the media. When the local media outlet, Al-Jazeera, provided coverage of a brutal 
police crackdown on a public demonstration, it was shut down – indicative of the suppression of 
media Kuwaitis face.46 The government strengthened its restrictions by banning public rallies in 
2010, banning political parties and censoring the internet; however, comparatively it allowed for 
a much freer state than its neighbors by allowing multiple independent media outlets, promoting 
academic freedom and allowing freedoms of assembly and association that meet governmental 
preferences. The Kuwaiti society had been so divisive that even those in favor of the uprisings 
                                                44	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Oman,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/oman.	45	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Oman.”	46	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Kuwait,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/kuwait.	
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within the country had experienced rifts. This was advantageous for the government because of 
the lack of collectivism amongst its dissidents. However, there were countries in the area whose 
divisive populations fueled uprisings, like the rebelling Shi’ite minority in Bahrain against the 
majority Sunni rule.  
 The protests of Shi’ites as a minority in Bahrain incited fear in neighboring governments 
that minorities within their own national boundaries could also rebel, regardless of their size. 
This proved to be the case for Saudi Arabia, whose former leader King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 
Al Saud was inclined to convert the domestic crisis in Bahrain into an issue of regional 
instability.47 In this instance, certain leaders in the Persian Gulf worked together to neutralize the 
conflicts and halt any further acts of rebellion, while simultaneously suggesting Iran (a majority 
Shi’ite nation) was involved in the Bahraini revolution.48 Bahrain’s king harnessed absolute rule 
over the government and outlawed political parties – mandating all political associations be 
registered with the Ministry of Justice.49 In addition to these restrictions, Bahrain experienced 
sectarian strife, censored Internet access, lacked freedom of expression and lacked freedom of 
press.50 All news outlets were government owned or had close ties to the government.51  
 Similar to its neighbor, Saudi Arabia is ruled by Sunni Muslims and has a 
disenfranchised Shiite community in addition to being increasingly restrictive of personal and 
civil liberties. The government outlawed all political parties, as well as organized political 
opposition, resulting in the only forms of dissidence to come from exile. Although Bahrain and 
                                                47	Farazmand,	Mohammad.	"The	Nature	of	2011	Arab	Uprisings:	A	Comparative	Analysis."	Iranian	Review	of	
Foreign	Affairs	2,	no.	2	(Summer	2011):	7-30.	48	Farazmand,	“Nature	of	2011	Arab	Uprisings,”	7-30.	49“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Bahrain,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,		https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/bahrain.	50“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Bahrain.”	51	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Saudi	Arabia,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,		https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/saudi-arabia.	
Mehari 
 
25 
Saudi Arabia were able to minimize the dissent and increase restrictions, certain rulers were 
unable to counteract the people’s calls for reform – like in Yemen. 
 Yemen’s political climate during the uprisings was especially brutal, and it is worthwhile 
to recall it is one of the two countries whose upheavals led to an ongoing civil war. 
Unfortunately, Yemen’s circumstances were exacerbated by its long history of conflict between 
the regions in the North and South, as well as Yemen’s security forces’ vicious tactics for 
aggressively halting protestors.52 When scholar Mohammad Farazmand describes Yemen, he 
writes: “A society which has been torn apart due to its tribal composition, separatism in the south 
and the Zaida Shia in the north, as well as Ali Abdullah Saleh’s divide and rule policy…”53 His 
text illuminates the ongoing insecurities and instabilities in Yemen, which are the result of more 
than just different sects of Islam or food insecurity. The people of Yemen endured a 32-year 
authoritarian rule by the former President Saleh, and despite refusing the people’s refusal to 
resort to violence, there was a collective sense of solidarity and unity that was visible as the 
people demanded the abdication of their dictator. 
 Syria and Yemen, both countries that resulted in ongoing civil wars even after their Arab 
counterparts’ uprisings came to a cessation, seemed to have varying results. Syria’s Bashar al-
Assad, alongside the Alawite minority, has ruled over Syria for generations. This means that a 
small population that does not represent the larger percentage of Syrians, has been in an 
exclusive position of power over the other ethnic and religious groups, not limited to the Sunni 
Muslims, the Kurdish rebel groups and the Salafi rebel groups. Enraged Syrians vastly 
outnumbered the repressive regime and its supporters, whether global in Russia, or local; still, 
Syria struggled to see the same levels of change that others did in North Africa. Many scholars 
                                                52	Farazmand,	“Nature	of	2011	Arab	Uprisings,”	7-30.	53	Farazmand,	“Nature	of	2011	Arab	Uprisings,”	7-30.	
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attributed the lack of progression to the type of governance (ruled by the minority), as well as the 
level of heterogeneity compared to the more successful ethnically homogenous countries, which 
explains the levels of territorial disintegration.54 Thus, Syria has experienced irreversible conflict 
that has led to its classification as the world’s leading largest refugee producing country.55 
Yemen experienced a similar situation, but it may have already been prone to conflict and 
violence because of its longstanding history of conflicts between the North and South. 
Nonetheless, both Yemen and Syria are comparable to Libya and the regimes alike because each 
ruler was willing to slaughter his people rather than relinquish the throne of power. 
 Figure 2 compares the restrictions on civil and political rights of the twelve countries 
most impacted by the Arab Spring as reported by Freedom House’s Annual Freedom Report.  
Country Status Freedom Rating Civil Liberties Political Rights 
Algeria Not Free 5.5 5 6 
Bahrain Not Free 5.5 5 6 
Egypt Not Free 5.5 5 6 
Jordan Not Free 5.5 5 6 
Kuwait Partly Free 4.5 5 4 
Libya Not Free 7 7 7 
Morocco Partly Free 4.5 4 5 
Oman Not Free 5.5 5 6 
Saudi Arabia Not Free 6.5 6 7 
Syria Not Free 6.5 6 7 
Tunisia Not Free 6 5 7 
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Yemen Not Free 5.5 5 6 
 
Figure 2: The Extent of Suppression leading up to the Arab Spring (1=Best, 7=Worst), 2011. 
 The people in the Middle East and North Africa wanted basic civil liberties; Figure 2 
conveys the lack of freedoms present at the time in which protestors took to the streets. The 
youthful generation of these countries’ citizens have rallied for a more democratic government 
through peaceful protests, hoping to form alternative political systems, end corruption, 
discrimination, and the political and economic prerogatives of the ruling elites – leading to 
freedom, equality, justice and welfare.56 Not all of the riots and rebellions subsided, as countries 
like Yemen and Syria protracted civil wars; however, the repression of civilians leads to an 
inevitable sense of disdain and need for change. 
 It is vital to observe the methods various governments used to suppress the rights of their 
people and the disparities amongst what individual freedoms were allowed in each respective 
nation. In most of the wealthier oil states, there were rigid regulations regarding religion, severe 
restrictions on freedom of speech, expression and media, heavy online censorship, and a lack of 
multiple political parties and assemblies. In North Africa, there were varying levels of freedoms 
associated with regimes, for instance, a multiparty system was allowed in Morocco, Algeria, 
Libya, and reformed in Egypt, while not at all in Tunisia. In reference to the poorer North 
African nations, the youth were more successful in strategically organizing peaceful protests and 
capitalizing off the instability and decentralized state. This led to a direct change in government 
rule, whereas in the wealthier states (even in North Africa), the governments were able to alter 
the policies surrounding the economy and appease protestors by instituting reforms. In the 
                                                56	Farazmand,	“Nature	of	2011	Arab	Uprisings,”	7-30.	
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countries that were unable to have large-scale protests due to immediate suppression, the 
governments tended to have tighter grip on its constituents as well as heightened fear.  
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Chapter 2: 
 This second chapter aims to provide the audience with the origins of Eritrea: from brief 
coverage of its historical oppressors to its long journey to independence to the current socio-
political climate. This context is critical to understanding how the government of Eritrea has 
arisen to power from the former Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and become the only 
political party allowed within the nation – The People’s Front for Democracy and Justice 
(PFDJ). In addition to understanding the political structures within the government, this chapter 
will convey the contemporary issue of conscription or national service within Eritrea and how 
this civic duty has morphed into being construed as every Eritrean’s duty, a concept reflected in 
the Nakfa Principles, which are commonly identified amongst Eritreans as moral and ethical 
values inscribed into their identity.  
 Although mobilizing citizens into the military and other forms of reconstructive service 
may seem superfluous, the problem of service is a continuation of the collectivist mindset and 
community based approach to life that is widespread in Eritrea and stems from a time in history 
when individual sacrifice was needed to reach independence. Over 25 years later and the 
government has framed the nation’s security as being at risk from its enemy and former 
oppressor, Ethiopia, as well as Western powers that support its neighbor. Furthermore, this 
section intends to contrast conscription in the North African and Middle Eastern countries that 
were deeply affected by the Arab Uprisings. In addition, this section will include significant 
cultural similarities shared between Eritrea and its Arab neighbors. Overall, the chapter will 
compare Eritrea and its relevance to the North African countries that experienced social and 
political upheaval during 2011 and how Eritrea’s socio-political relations were in route to a 
similar outcome of its regional counterparts, had mobilization and individualism been the 
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priorities. In a continuation of the previous chapter, this argument lays the groundwork to 
connect the relevance of the Arab Spring to Eritrea and why Eritrea has been stagnant in political 
dissidence within the country.  
Eritrea: From Colonialism to Liberation to the Contemporary Context 
 The nation of Eritrea has had a long history of oppression in regards to the 
disenfranchisement of Eritrean peoples by the Ottoman, Egyptian, British, Italian, and Ethiopian 
forces.57 Eritrea was recognized as a federation of Italy in the 19th century, and then was seized 
under British rule from 1941 until 1952, when it was annexed as a federation of Ethiopia. Eritrea 
endured a thirty years armed struggle from 1961 to 1991, while simultaneously experiencing 
political upheaval between two competing guerilla armies: Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). With varying ideologies, the first Eritrean guerilla 
army, ELF, attempted to suppress the arising dissident group, EPLF, from as early as 1972, until 
the two groups came to a truce in 1974.58 It was not until 1981 that the ELF was extinguished 
and exiled from Eritrea by the EPLF.59 The leadership of the ELF was formed amongst Muslim 
scholars and intellectuals, mainly receiving support from Arab and Muslim states like Egypt and 
Sudan.60 This movement later reached Eritrean Christians – also encompassing a multitude of 
tribes and clans within a pluralistic society. The tension led to the formation of the EPLF, which 
was spearheaded by Isaias Afewerki.  
 Isaias Afewerki, known to many as the freedom fighter that led the Eritrean people to 
victory, has held office in Eritrea as president since it reached independence. Officially, in April 
                                                57	Connell,	Dan,	and	Tom	Killion.	2010.	Historical	dictionary	of	Eritrea.	[electronic	resource].	n.p.:	Lanham	:	Scarecrow	Press,	2010,	2010.	58	Connell	and	Killion,	Historical	dictionary.	59	Connell	and	Killion,	Historical	dictionary.	60	Rich	Dorman,	Sara.	2005.	"Narratives	of	nationalism	in	Eritrea:	research	and	revisionism."	Nations	&	Nationalism	11,	no.	2:	203-222.	
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1993, the international community formally recognized Eritrea as sovereign after fulfilling the 
UN-supervised referendum. It has been nearly 26 years that Eritrean citizens have recognized 
themselves as a part of an independent nation, and technically 24 by the international 
community; all throughout, Isaias Afewerki has reigned. There has not been a single national 
election since the UN-supervised referendum, nor has the constitution been implemented, with 
an indefinite postponement.61 The only ruling political party allowed in Eritrea is the successor 
of the EPLF, known as the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). It is illegal for any 
competing nationalist party to exist in Eritrea, and the government refuses to permit the return of 
any of its rival factions.62 As the majority of Eritreans now live outside of the country, PFDJ has 
extended its membership to include diaspora living abroad in hopes of exercising an annual 2% 
tax to support the government. These recurring 2% taxes are masked as the government’s 
attempt at reconstruction post independence. The organization connected to the expansive 
diaspora network of government supporters is the Young People’s Front for Democracy and 
Justice (YPFDJ). With access to political power within Eritrea and abroad amongst its 
supporters, Isaias Afewerki and PFDJ have constructed an “iron curtain” around the country to 
protect it from its neighbors and the disapproving members of the international community. To 
further solidify the link between nationalism within Eritrea and transnationalism from the 
expatriates and diaspora communities across the globe, the Ministers and PFDJ officials attend 
the diaspora’s festivals and nation-wide community meetings outside of Eritrea.63 These events 
include: the Annual North American YPFDJ Conference, Martyrs’ Day, Annual Eritrean Festival 
in D.C., and events alike that connect the younger and older generations of Eritrea abroad with 
the agendas of PFDJ. The government is selective with receiving foreign aid, promoting that 
                                                61	Dorman,	“Narratives”,	203-222.	62	Dorman,	“Narratives”,	203-222.	63	Dorman,	“Narratives”,	203-222.	
Mehari 
 
32 
Eritrea will become self-reliant and exude resilience by avoiding the corruption that often lingers 
with foreign aid. There were 38 international aid agencies in the 1990s but only four by 2009.64 
The 30-year long independence struggle bred not only freedom, but also overwhelming levels of 
nationalism that have left millions of supporters blind to the corruption inflicted by the despotic 
regime. 
 So what is distinct about Eritrea? Why has the country not followed in its neighbors’ 
footsteps? Contrary to the political climate of the North African countries during the Arab 
Spring, Eritrea’s citizens have been unable to mobilize an effort to rebel. In fact, the only case of 
mobilization within Eritrea has stemmed from the government.  African Studies PhD. Researcher 
David M. Bozzini writes: 
People whom I call conscripts are male and female individuals carrying 
out national duty as required by law: they are temporarily mobilised for 
military and civil purposes by the state... However, since 1998 and the two 
years war against Ethiopia, National Service has been indefinitely 
extended and no demobilisation program has taken place” 65 (93). 
 
 The “conscripts” of Eritrea are born into a systematic oppression resembling modern day 
slavery. They are forced to serve their nation regardless of their political views and expected to 
remain obedient while earning less than necessary wage to survive and support their families 
back home. Bozzini articulates the conditions of service and the only instance where 
mobilization takes place in Eritrea. This obligation is resented by the youthful generation in 
Eritrea, much more than the older generations, which fought for the nation’s independence.  
                                                64	Jopson,	Barney.	2009.	“Inside	the	Insular	and	Secretive	Eritrea.”	Financial	Times.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.ft.com/content/8a70d442-a324-11de-ba74-00144feabdc0.		65	Bozzini,	David.	2011.	“Low-tech	Surveillance	and	the	Despotic	State	in	Eritrea.”	Surveillance	and	Society	9	(1/2):	93-113.	
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 There is a sizable gap separating what the older and younger generation view as civic 
duties, which explains the rise in those attempting to leave Eritrea. According to scholar Sara 
Dorman, “Since the summer of 2001, Eritrean youth have been at the centre of political crises. 
The rejection, by some youth, of societal and state expectations that they will ‘serve the nation’ 
challenges the post-liberation political institutions”.66 The notion of service is glorified in Eritrea 
by older generations. The reverence is apparent in holidays of remembrance, like Martyrs’ Day, 
as scholar Bereketeab writes, “No one died; they simply became a martyr.”67 Despite the culture 
of youthful sacrifice, this was an overwhelming trait pertinent to a different era, one that was 
prior to independence. Scholar Tesfai writes, “Martyrdom was an inevitable outcome of 
liberation.”68 The issue with this reflection in application to the contemporary context is that 
liberation has already been attained; yet the youth is placed under a cultural expectation to risk 
their lives when their freedom should have already been secured. National service spans from 
military service to civil service and public sector projects that contribute to the ongoing national 
reconstruction.69 In addition to adult citizens fleeing Eritrea after being conscripted, there are 
children who have not even reached secondary school and are evading the draft, many of which 
have not even reached the age of 14.70 Regardless of age, this program contributes directly to the 
mass migration of Eritrean refugees to all parts of the world. “In 2015, the largest number of 
applications for asylum in the UK came from nationals of Eritrea (3,729)”71 The number of 
                                                66	Dorman,	Sara	Rich.	"Past	the	Kalashnikov:	Youth,	Politics	and	the	State	in	Eritrea."	Last	modified	June	17,	2004,	1-20.	67	Bereketeab,	Redie.	“Eritrea:	The	Making	of	a	Nation	1890-1991”	2000.	Uppsala	University.		68	Tesfai,	Alemseged.	2002.	Two	Weeks	in	the	Trenches:	reminiscences	of	childhood	and	war	in	Eritrea.	Lawrenceville,	NJ,	Red	Sea.	69	O’Kane,	David,	and	Tricia	M.	Redeker	Hepner.	2009.	Biopolitics,	Militarism,	and	Development:	Eritrea	in	the	
Twenty-First	Century.	New	York:	Berghahn	Books.	70	Interview	with	author,	April	25,	2017.	71	"Asylum,"	Asylum	-	GOV.UK.	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2015/asylum#unaccompanied-asylum-seeking-children-uasc.	
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Eritreans that flee to Ethiopia and Sudan is colossal in comparison to those that make it to 
developed nations like Italy, United Kingdom, Germany and the rest of the Global North. In 
2008, at least 43,000 fled Eritrea to Sudan or Ethiopia. Eritrea is ranked as the second-biggest 
source of asylum seekers by the UN, despite having ranked 113th in population size.72 It is 
estimated that at least a quarter of a million refugees live in neighboring Sudan and Ethiopia 
within refugee camps.73  
 What the world views as the refugee exodus is the aftermath of those who are able to 
escape past the “shoot-to-kill”74 borders. The CIA writes, “His government has created a highly 
militarized society by pursuing an unpopular program of mandatory conscription into national 
service, sometimes of indefinite length”. According to the UN Commission of Inquiry, some of 
the terrible conditions during the indefinite duration of national service include “arbitrary 
detention, torture, sexual torture, forced labour, absence of leave and the ludicrous pay…make 
national service an institution where slavery-like practices are routine.”75 Not all who participate 
in national service experience these conditions; however, an overwhelming number of conscripts 
have been forced to flee because of these horrendous circumstances.  
 Eritrea’s regional counterparts in North Africa: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Sudan 
and Morocco all have levels of conscription associated with each nation. Despite the similar 
laws, the difference between Eritrea and many of the other countries is the strict enforcement 
alongside the poor standard of living and quality of life. In many Arab-speaking countries, such 
                                                72	Jopson,	“Inside	the	Insular	and	Secretive	Eritrea.”		73	Brhane,	Mogos	O.	2016.	"Understanding	why	Eritreans	go	to	Europe."	Destination:	Europe,	34-35.	74	“Eritrea:	20	Years	of	independence,	but	still	no	freedom,”	Amnesty	International,	36.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr640012013.pdf	75	"Report	of	the	Commission	of	inquiry	on	human	rights	in	Eritrea."	United	Nation.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	13.	http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A-HRC-29-42_en.pdf.	
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as Egypt or Syria, conscription targets males between 18-30 that have another male sibling.76 
Conversely, Eritrea does not discriminate entry based on gender. In fact, Eritreans between the 
ages of 18-40 are required to serve in the national service as a direct result of the Warsay-
Yikealo Development Campaign in 2002.77 In order to grasp context as to why this campaign 
was passed, it is essential to understand the prior 1998-2000 border dispute between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia over the major war zone of Badme. When describing the situation of Badme, scholar 
Jon Abbink describes it as, “One of the most intense and bloody wars that Africa has seen in 
recent years, with an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 deaths.” The highly politicized border dispute 
over Badme occurred within a decade of independence, which made both wars relevant in the 
politics of Eritrean daily life. In December 2000, a peace accord known as the Algiers 
Agreement ruled that Badme was a part of Eritrea.78 Despite this internationally recognized 
arbitrational ruling, Ethiopia has not accepted the terms and ruling of the decision. The state of 
Eritrea has used this war as a need for the Warsay-Yikealo Development Campaign as well as 
ongoing mobilization of citizens. By framing its neighbor as an existential threat, Eritrea 
becomes the referent object and its military is able to move towards securitization of the people 
by means of mandatory civic service.79 Alongside the post-structurialist framework of security 
studies, scholar David Campbell argues, “The constitution of identity is achieved through the 
inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an 
“other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign.”80 In the case of Eritrea, the government has constructed 
Eritreans as the “inside” and Ethiopia as the “outside” threat. The Eritrean people are able to 
                                                76	“The	World	Factbook,”	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html.		77	Dorman,	"Narratives	of	nationalism	in	Eritrea,”	203-222.	78	“Reports	of	international	arbitral	awards,”	United	Nations,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXV/216-224.pdf.	79	Campbell,	David.	1998.	Writing	security:	United	States	foreign	policy	and	the	politics	of	identity.	n.p.:	Minneapolis	:	University	of	Minnesota	Press.	80	Campbell,	Writing	Security.	
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retain and solidify this “inside” identity by subscribing to a set of principles or values that unite 
them within their culture: The Nakfa Principles. In the “Eritrean National Identity: A Case 
Study”, Ann Peggy Hoyle describes component values of Eritrean national identity in terms of 
ethical behavior, belief in critical public speech, perseverance or steadfastness, an emphasis on 
the community over the individual, and a commitment to self-reliance.81 The Nakfa Principles 
are in Tigrinya, which does not always translate smoothly into English, but Hoyle’s description 
encapsulates the general themes. In Tigrinya they are written as: Ma’arinet (Equality), Harinet 
(Individual Freedom), Natsinet (Independence or Liberation from the Colonizer), Tsinat 
(Resilience/Perseverance), Tewefainet (Sacrifice/Martyrdom) and Bitsaynet (Camaraderie).82 
These values are the closest way to describe the Nakfa Principles that have become engrained in 
the daily lives of Eritrean citizens; they are used as socio-cultural leverage to maintain the status 
quo and decisions made by the government. The aforementioned emphasis on the community 
over the individual is the reason that systems in place, like conscription, are able to exist. In 
theory, national service aiming to further reconstruction could bolster living conditions; 
however, in the case of Eritrea, the scarce nominal wage and excessive constraints on conscripts 
delegitimize the initial aims of the program while impeding citizens’ abilities to sustain a livable 
wage. 
  In 2011 as the first signs of rebellion occurred in Tunisia, Eritrea was experiencing 
ongoing repression in the form of requiring blind nationalism under the guise of civic duty. 
According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “The state has justified the mass 
mobilization with the need for national development and to foster a common sense of national 
                                                81	Hoyle,	Ann	Peggy.	1999.	"Eritrean	National	Identity:	A	Case	Study."	North	Carolina	Journal	of	International	
Law	and	Commercial	Regulation	24,	no.	2:	401-05.		82	Interview	with	author,	April	25,	2017.	
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identity.”83 The reason the youth are inherently incapable of organizing is the systematic 
oppression that is Sawa84 alongside the vehement control the government has in the lives of its 
citizens. The students in Eritrea are able to attend primary and secondary school until eleventh 
grade, then they must leave their homes and complete their final year at Sawa. Students are not 
able to travel freely from Sawa to their homes within this year and must receive specified 
permission from their respective authorities, unless it is a major national holiday. After the 
completion year at Sawa, there is a standardized national exam administered and pending 
results85, students are to be placed in a university or vocational assignment. Unfortunately, many 
education sites have closed, so students are frequently placed wherever there is a shortage of 
labor, regardless of their ambitions.86 Despite the process of higher education placement, 
students are forced into a cloaked civic duty that typically extends far past the 18-month promise. 
Some are never able to reach higher education as their service is extended. According to the 
CFR, “In addition, the Government has subjected much of the population to open-ended national 
service, either in the army or through the civil service, often for years in harsh and inhumane 
conditions.”87  
                                                83	Zachary	Laub,	2015.	"Authoritarianism	in	Eritrea	and	the	Migrant	Crisis."	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.cfr.org/eritrea/authoritarianism-eritrea-migrant-crisis/p37239.	84	Sawa	is	a	military	training	camp	designed	to	ensure	Eritrean	youths	are	prepared	to	serve	in	national	service.	85	The	Eritreans	who	do	not	score	above	a	certain	caliber	(score	of	1.8)	are	sent	to	places	like	Mamose	to	learn	trades	such	as	plumbing,	carpentry,	etc.	Only	those	who	score	above	1.8	are	able	to	pursue	higher	education	for	professions	like	business,	education,	marketing,	etc.	86	Interview	with	author,	April	25,	2017.	87	“Thousands	of	civilians	fleeing	‘rule	of	fear’	in	Eritrea,	say	UN	experts,	warning	of	gross	rights	abuses,”	UN	News	Centre,	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51239#.WC0d7KIrKqA	
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Figure 3: Close up image of Sawa military camp, 2015. 
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Figure 4: Camp Accommodation and School, Detention Facilities, 2015.  
 Figure 3 and 4 depict the various secured facilities that students and prisoners occupy, all 
within a remote location. The dotted blue and dotted red rectangular lines in the bottom half of 
the image show the “Warsai Yikealo Secondary School”. Within these red lines is where Eritrean 
students who are studying for their final year of secondary school reside, while the dashed blue 
lines represent the “Accommodation of Conscripts”, where the Eritreans who are to serve for 
national civic duty are stationed. The close proximity of the two buildings is ironic because the 
former is for many students a direct pathway to the latter. Neither of the accommodations, 
prisons or schools, are in exceptional conditions because of the arid weather combined with the 
location and resources. After a student is given a placement, he or she is expected to remain 
within that field regardless of preference. The government chooses its citizens’ occupation and 
there is no further deliberation unless a need for an alternate service arises. In this case, a worker 
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would be permitted to change occupations, but this does not result in further education. Instead, 
one would be sent to the area requiring service and the worker would be trained on site.88  
 In Figure 4, the nearby prisons depicted with green dotted lines, yellow dotted lines, and 
large red circles are where those who attempt to defect from Sawa end up, as well as those who 
express political dissent. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, “The Eritrean government uses 
a vast apparatus of official and secret detention facilities to incarcerate thousands of Eritreans 
without charge or trial.”89 Many of these detention facilities in Eritrea, like the one depicted in 
the figures above, had not previously been revealed to the rest of the world until these images 
were made available in 2015. In fact, HRW revealed, “Many of the prisoners are detained for 
their political or religious beliefs, other because they tried to evade the indefinite national service 
or flee the country.”90 These conditions described by the human rights crusader may stem from 
concerns that began after the imprisonment of the ‘G-15’, the group of 15 former top government 
officials and former liberation leaders that were jailed after writing an open letter in 2001 calling 
for a ‘peaceful and democratic dialogue’. The following chapter will further unpack the methods 
and levels of suppression within the Eritrea, covering the ‘G-15’ in depth. National security 
continues to serve as the guise in which the government is able to reign without repercussion; 
however, Eritrea has gained traction in the global community for the claims of injustices within 
the country. 
Why is Eritrea Comparable to North Africa and the Middle East? 
 Aside from having an authoritarian regime that has postponed elections indefinitely, 
Eritrea has many political, economic, and social characteristics that mirror those of the Arab 
                                                88	Interview	with	author,	April	25,	2017.	89	"Eritrea:	Repression	Creating	Human	Rights	Crisis."	2015.	Human	Rights	Watch.	Accessed	April	12,	2017,	https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/16/eritrea-repression-creating-human-rights-crisis.	90	“”Eritrea:	Repression	Creating	Human	Rights	Crisis.”	
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world. Although the majority of Eritreans speak Tigrinya, the nation’s second official language 
is Arabic, followed by English. Islam is a prominent religion practiced in Eritrea; therefore, 
Arabic is the cultural language of many Eritreans. This separates many different types of 
Eritreans that are unable to have social mobility within commerce or government because their 
mother tongues, whether they are Bilen, or Kunama, as some tribes are not represented in 
government positions or popular businesses. Within the nine tribes of Eritrea, the Nilotic people 
consist of the Kunama and Nara tribes. The Cushitic people consist of Afar, Saho, Bilen, 
Hedarab tribes. The Semitic people are the Tigrinya, Tigre and Rashaida.91 Within these tribes, 
the Tigrinya tribe is the largest in Eritrea, followed by the Tigre, which correlates to how these 
tribes hold the largest recognition of social status, business owners and government office. These 
same Semitic people are recognized as Afro-Asiatic and having Arab roots dating back to the 
invasions by the Ottoman Empire and crossing over the Red Sea from the Middle East.92 Despite 
the nine tribes which each have a respective language, the official language systems recognized 
within Eritrea have been simplified to a binary construct – elevating the Christian-Tigrinya and 
the Islamic-Arabic. By administering two official languages that belong to distinct groups within 
Eritrea, the government has been able to separate socio-cultural groups, creating or further 
perpetuating a system of elites more inclined to positions of power and preserving distinct 
customs within the nation; these practices are similar to the treatment of Berbers in North Africa 
and various minority ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East. Just as the countries in 
Middle East are predominantly Muslim, with some answering to Sharia courts, Eritrea has a 
significant Muslim population that separates its judicial practices to respect the religious abiding 
                                                91	Bereketeab,	Redie.	2010.	"The	Politics	of	Language	in	Eritrea:	Equality	of	Languages	Vs.	Bilingual	Official	Language	Policy."	African	&	Asian	Studies	9,	no.	1/2:	149-190.		92	Connell	and	Killion,	Historical	dictionary.		
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to Islam. In fact, within Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, Connell and Killion note that Eritrea 
was one of the earliest non-Arabian sites for contact with Islam. Approximately half of the 
population in Eritrea is Muslim, mainly residing in the lowlands while Christians are mostly in 
the highlands.  
 There was a constitution approved in 1997 that still has not been enforced. This allows 
the chief of state, Isaias Afewerki, to monopolize levels of authority within the regime, 
subsequently allowing himself a life-long term. The individual rights have been disregarded for 
the rights of the collective.93 Scholars recognize safeguarding the nation shapes the climate 
within Eritrea, often disregarding the personal liberties that are celebrated in the West. Citizens 
within Eritrea are able to view others outside of the country enjoying the luxuries of living in a 
less restricted nation, which motivates the youth to flee the country in hopes of a better life. The 
CIA reports that Eritrea’s population was of 5,869,869 in 2016. Researcher Michael Aliprandini 
reported that Eritrea had a population of 6,527,689 in 2015. Previously, there had been a reported 
population 2.25% population growth;94 however, sources like the UNHCR report that 5,000 
refugees leave Eritrea each month.95 The U.N. estimates that 400,000 Eritreans—9% of the 
population—have fled in recent years, not counting those who died or were stranded en route.”96 
This discrepancy indicates the lack of accountability within the records of Eritrea and the lack of 
focus that researchers give to the country. Like many Arab states, the value placed on Eritrea 
correlates with the natural resources that can be extracted. In 2015, Eritrea was ranked 186th of 
188 on the United Nations Human Development Index, which is indicative of the lack of decent 
                                                93	Bereketeab,	Redie.	2016.	Eritrea’s	refugee	crisis	and	the	role	of	the	international	community.	Nordiska	Afrikainstitutet.	94	Aliprandini,	Michael.	2016.	"Eritrea."	1.	MAS	Ultra	-	School	Edition.	95	Bereketeab,	“Eritrea’s	refugee	crisis.”	96	Stevis,	Matina,	and	Joe	Parkinson.	"Thousands	flee	isolated	Eritrea	to	escape	life	of	conscription	and	poverty."	The	Wall	Street	Journal.	February	02,	2016.	
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standard of living in addition to the lack of basic human needs. The Human Development Index 
conducted by the United Nations Development Program listed Eritrea at 179h place as of 2016.97 
The Youth unemployment rate for those ages 15-24 is 13%, which is a rise from 2011.98 
According to the Eritrea Country Review, at least 50% of the population is living below the 
poverty line. As majority of the population participates in subsistence agriculture, families 
typically are getting by making what they are able to use themselves, instead of having a 
profitable surplus in which they are able to engage in market trades with. An estimated 80% of 
the population participates in agricultural subsistence, despite the recurring droughts and 
overgrazing of lands within the country year round. As economic conditions remain stagnant, it 
is no surprise the nation placed 162 out of 178 on the “Life Satisfaction Index” with a score of 
146.67, which assesses the notion of subjective happiness with qualitative parameters such as 
health, wealth, and access to basic education.99 
 In accordance with these facts, observers notice the driving factors of the refugee exodus 
include the ongoing results of “no war no peace”100 situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
Within this, Bereketeab reports the factors of: constant threat of war, indefinite national service, 
harsh political environment, economic hardship, unemployment, blanket asylum provision by 
host communities, sanctions, and unfortunately, the hopelessness youth looking for alternative 
future.101 These driving factors parallel the significant driving factors that led countries within 
North Africa to start the Arab uprisings in 2011. The data shown in Figure 5 are meant to 
compare and convey conscription details of countries affected by the Arab Spring in North 
                                                97	“Eritrea,”	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ERI.	98“Youth	Unemployment	rate,”	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/110906	99	“	Eritrea:	2017	Country	Review,”	Country	Watch,	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.countrywatch.com/Content/pdfs/reviews/B38MQ88L.01c.pdf	100	“Eritrea:	2017	Country	Review”		101	“Eritrea:	2017	Country	Review”	
Mehari 
 
44 
Africa and the Middle East; all the statistics were all obtained from the CIA’s World 
Factbook.102 
Country Conscription Exist? Age Range? Length of Service? 
Algeria Yes, Mandatory 17= min for voluntary 
military service, 19-
30= legal min in case 
of general/partial 
compulsory 
mobilization 
18 months service= 6 
months basic training, 
12 months civil 
projects 
Bahrain No, Voluntary 18= min for voluntary 
military service, 15= 
for NCOs, technician 
and cadets 
No mandatory 
conscription 
Egypt Yes, Mandatory 16= min for voluntary 
military service, 18-
30= male conscript 
military service 
18-36 month followed 
by 9 year reserve 
obligation 
Jordan  No, Voluntary 17= voluntary male 
military service 
Initial service=2 
years, option to 
reenlist for 18 years, 
women not subject to 
conscription but can 
volunteer to serve in 
noncombat military 
positions in the Royal 
Jordanian Arab Army 
Women’s Corps and 
RJAF, Conscription 
was suspended 
Kuwait  No, Voluntary 17-21= voluntary 
military service 
Conscription was 
suspended 
                                                102	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html	
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Libya Yes 18=min for mandatory 
or voluntary service 
No indicated 
timeframe  
Morocco No, Voluntary 20= min for voluntary 
military service 
No conscription, 
service obligation= 18 
months 
Oman No, Voluntary 18-30= voluntary 
military service 
No conscription 
Saudi Arabia  No, Voluntary 17=min for voluntary 
military service 
No conscription 
Sudan Yes 18-33= male and 
female compulsory or 
voluntary military 
service 
1-2 year service 
obligation, previously 
required before 
entering public/private 
sector employment 
has been cancelled 
Syria Yes 18=compulsory and 
voluntary military 
service 
Conscript service 
obligation=18 months, 
women not 
conscripted but may 
volunteer to serve, re-
enlistment obligation 
5 years, w/ retirement 
after 15 years or age 
40, or 20 years or age 
45 
Tunisia  Yes 20-23= compulsory 
service, 18-23= 
voluntary service 
1 year service 
obligation 
Yemen No, Voluntary 18=legal min for 
voluntary military  
No conscription, 2 
year obligation 
 
Figure 5: Conscription during the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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 There is a consistent trait of all of the countries in North Africa listed in Figure 5: they all 
have military conscription. This is parallel to Eritrea’s conscription policy, although certain 
nations make exceptions for service based on gender. All of the Middle Eastern countries listed 
in Figure 5, with the exception of Syria, have ceased any form of mandatory conscription and 
allow the option of voluntary military service. The relevance of these statistics aims to highlight 
the oppressive nature of service that Eritrea shares with its regional neighbors that are considered 
Arab and were deeply affected by the Arab Spring, with the exception of Sudan – who had just 
ended a civil war at the time with what is now South Sudan. The data that links Eritrea to the rest 
of North Africa reveals the similar situations of unemployment, lack of resources, food 
shortages, lack of government subsidies and overall lack of good governance. Much like its 
neighboring countries, Eritrea’s government has failed in providing its poorer communities with 
necessary resources to thrive, while maintaining restrictive policies on its people. 
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Chapter 3: 
 What is the significance of observing the Arab Spring and the environments of countries 
that were able to overthrow their political leaders versus those countries that were heavily 
suppressed? Does this signify the ability citizens have to mobilize within a respective context (or 
even what has been referred to as a “contagion effect”103)? How does the reaction to the “G-15” 
and tense treatment depict the repercussions of practicing forms of human expression and 
feelings of contempt within Eritrea? This chapter aims to connect the previous chapter’s 
coverage of Eritrea’s conscription with the essence of Eritrea’s state of surveillance. It is 
imperative that these comparisons are made in full, which means one can not neglect identifying 
the mediums of suppression used within the context of Eritrea to ultimately prevent dissent and 
simultaneously breed fear. The enigmatic nature of the regime’s political restrictions, which seep 
into socio-cultural interactions, is critical to identify when discussing how Eritrea has lagged in 
comparison to its regional counterparts with political upheaval in response to restricted liberties. 
Thus, this chapter will ultimately explore the possibilities of what Eritrea would have needed to 
successfully achieve variant levels of success as the twelve countries most affected by the Arab 
Uprisings, as well as if the preceding factors of dissent are applicable after investigating social 
and political institutions present in Eritrea.  
 Before reaching the conclusion of what Eritrea would have needed to reach widespread 
levels of dissidence within the country, this chapter will first research the government’s 
restrictions on civil and personal liberties. In addition to the exploration of political procedures 
and norms set in place, this chapter will delve into the topic of collective nationalism stressed 
                                                103	Scholar	Ioana	Matesan	describes	the	contagion	effect	as	a	mechanism	of	revolutionary	cascade	that	signaled	nonviolent	tactics	have	wide	public	appeal	across	the	region.	She	references	Eva	Bellin,	who	suggests	that	the	logic	of	deliberate	diffusion,	which	refers	to	the	conscious	sharing	of	tactics	by	activist;	and	the	logic	of	the	demonstration	effect,	which	suggests	that	successful	precedents	can	set	off	waves	of	optimism	and	euphoria	that	become	more	powerful	than	rational	considerations	about	risks	and	benefits.	
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over individual identity or ethnicity, economic restraints, homogeneity within the media and 
culture in Eritrea – allowing one to further understand the demographic build up that remains 
after those in danger have fled Eritrea and how the Eritrean diaspora relates to the apparatus of 
citizens.  
The Suppression of Media in Eritrea: 
 In recent years, Eritrea has received immense negative publicity from the international 
community, but there was a catalyst that led to the current stigmas associated with the country in 
the Horn of Africa. Currently, there are only two news outlets allowed in Eritrea and they are 
both state-sponsored, meaning the government controls and approves the media that is 
distributed within the country and abroad to those in the diaspora that maintain their Eritrean 
identity transnationally. These aforementioned news media are known as EriTV and EriTV2 – 
the former is broadcasted globally via satellite and the latter is for the locals within the country; 
they disseminate information from Eritrea’s Ministry of Information.104 According to the 
Eritrean Embassy’s website, “Eritrea’s main objectives in this field are to: develop free, 
responsible and credible mass media: to promote the democratization process and strengthen 
national unity: to provide the public with news and timely information…to enhance public 
debate and discussion.”105 Despite the current state of press in Eritrea, obligatory state-controlled 
media was not always the case. In fact, there had previously been eight news outlets that 
operated independently.  
 In 2001, the government cracked down on private media and news outlets within the 
country, in response to the open letter calling for a ‘peaceful and democratic dialogue’ by a 
group of fifteen former top government officials and liberation leaders (The G-15): Mahmud 
                                                104	“Media	and	Communication,”	Embassy	of	the	State	of	Eritrea,	Accessed	on	April	26,	2017,	http://eritrean-embassy.se/press-release/media.	105	“Media	and	Communication.”	
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Ahmed Sheriffo (PFDJ and National Council), Haile Woldensae (PFDJ, National Council, and 
Ministerial Cabinet), Mesfin Hagos (PFDJ Executive Committee, National Council), Ogbe 
Abrha (former General, PFDJ and National Council), Hamid Hmd (PFDJ and National Council 
Member), Saleh Kekya (PFDJ and National Council), Estifanos Seyoum (Former General, PFDJ 
and National Council), Berhane Ghebreghzabiher (PFDJ and National Council), Astier 
Feshatsion (PFDJ and National Council), Mohammed Berhan Blata (PFDJ and National 
Council), Petros Solomon (PDFJ, National Council and Ministerial Cabinet), Germano Nati 
(PFDJ and National Council), Adhanom Ghebremariam (PFDJ and National Council), and Haile 
Menkerios (PFDJ and National Council).106 To gain deeper understanding of the backlash these 
politicians faced, it is crucial to examine the collective legislation they presented to the rest of 
their political governing body, the PFDJ. In the Open Letter to All PFDJ Members, the G-15 
expressed, “This letter is a call for correction, a call for peaceful and democratic dialogue, a call 
for strengthening and consolidation, a call for unity, a call for the rule of law and for justice, 
through peaceful and legal ways and means.”107 The letter that led to the imprisonment of the 
former politicians and Tegaldelti108 began as a nonviolent petition for the acknowledgement of a 
common goal established prior to the international legitimization of the Eritrea, yet it was 
immediately rendered a threat to national security as an attempt to overthrow the president. 2001 
marked eight years of unrestrained leadership by a ruler instead of a progression towards a 
constitutional government and democracy – the same factors that oppressed Eritreans in the form 
of Egyptians, Ottomans, Italians, British, Ethiopians and arguably the ELF – which believed 
                                                106	“Open	letter	to	all	PFDJ	Members,”	Accessed	on	April	26,	2017,	http://www.snitna.com/docs/Open_Letter_to_All_PFDJ_Members_by_G_15_english.pdf	107	“Open	letter	to	all	PFDJ	Members.”	108	Tegaldelti	is	an	esteemed	term	used	to	recognize	the	freedom	fighters	that	fought	for	Eritrea’s	independence.			
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Eritrea was not ready for a multi-party presence. The G-15 outlined their request contingent on 
the wills of the people who professed united aims when freeing the nation. They wrote, “In the 
Eritrean reality, guaranteeing and consolidating internal democracy within the PFDJ is essential 
to ensure a democratic process of transition and the establishment of a democratic constitutional 
government; and our aim and message is this, and only this.”109 The motive behind this letter was 
a direct response to the limitedness of the regime; unfortunately, it defied the status quo of 
following the highest forms of authority within the country, obediently. Nevertheless, this was a 
clear attempt at reformation and justice starting with an internal assembly that answered directly 
to the head of the state. The rest of the letter went on to describe the experience of the EPLF, its 
preliminary stage, its plight until liberation, post-referendum, and concluded with methods to 
resolve the particular crisis the country had been facing.  
 In many democratic nations, there is an understood social contract110 that allows citizens 
to hold their respective governments accountable for areas of improvement, which is often 
addressed through electoral procedures. The twelve Arab nations observed throughout these 
arguments had unifying experiences regarding rigged and unfair elections, as well as restrictions 
placed on the right to assemble. What is to be done in the case of a nation that has indefinitely 
postponed elections? Can there be an accountability system in place when those who hold office 
are not required to respond to the pleas of their people, including the legislative members? Who 
is liable to the citizens or is there a lack of responsibility that has been enclosed in governmental 
positions of power? All members of the G-15 were part of the PFDJ and the National Council, 
                                                109	“Open	letter	to	all	PFDJ	Members.”	110	Celeste	Friend,	“Social	Contract	Theory,”	in	Internet	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/.		
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yet any opposing opinions were deemed intolerable and treasonous. The G-15 is a precedent for 
any aspiring journalist in Eritrea but that is not the extent of their representation.  
 The danger of being jailed for writing, reading or speaking ill of the president is what has 
been instilled through these acts and dispersed amongst the Eritrean people living within the 
country, a luxury that the diaspora is not in an immediate danger of. There is a powerful motive 
of remaining submissive when you are helplessly encountering fear in every social space.111 The 
accredited scholarship post-2001 that exists about Eritrea’s political climate and any sense of 
dissent is published outside of the country. Eritrea’s Ministry of Information releases the 
propaganda-like information published within the borders of Eritrea, and private sources of 
media or press are not allowed within Eritrea.112 This has sparked the demand for letters like the 
Open Letter to All PFDJ Members, international attention of human rights organizations and free 
press institutions, as well as Eritreans who have fled the country in an attempt to stay safe, i.e.: 
the refugee exodus. 
 In the case of the G-15, nine of the senior government officials have been confirmed as 
dead.113 Baraki Gebreselassi, Germano Nati, Hamid Hmd, Estifanos Seyoum, Saleh Keyka, 
Astier Feshatsion, Mahmud Ahmed Sheriffo, and Obge Abrha all died within captivity as a result 
of harsh conditions and the lack of thorough medical attention, except Berhane Gebregzabhier, 
who was executed. In addition to the deaths of the senior government officials, there were also 
arrested journalists who died in captivity. All of the political prisoners were initially held in 
Embat’kala prison and the rest in Era’ero prison. According to interviews conducted by Human 
Rights Concern Eritrea, “At first, it wasn’t a prison facility at all. It was a school and a training 
                                                111	Bozzini,	David.	2015.	"The	Fines	and	the	Spies:	Fears	of	State	Surveillance	in	Eritrea	and	in	the	Diaspora."	
Social	Analysis	59,	no.	4:	32-49.	112	“Media	and	Communication.”	113	“All	but	two	of	the	11	former	senior	government	officials	of	Eritrea	confirmed	dead.”	2009.	Assenna.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.ehrea.org/gd.pdf	
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centre for various kinds of skills.”114 Because of the initial purpose of the facility, the conditions 
for prisoners were much more tolerable. However, the descriptions of Era’ero prison encapsulate 
the severity in response to those who challenge the regime. In an interview with a former prison 
guard, Human Rights Concern Eritrea discovered, “Era’ero is different from Embat’kala. 
Embat’kala was not designed for prisoners and the prisoners could at least go out twice a day. In 
Era’ero however, they are kept in their cells for 24 hours. They don’t even know whether it is 
day or night…the climactic conditions at Era’ero were too harsh for the prisoners and prison 
guards.”115 When a former member of Eritrea’s security division can attest to the severity of the 
conditions, which both the guards and prisoners faced, it is indicative of the rights or the lack of 
rights of citizens within the nation. The means to solve the problem that is the oppression and 
regression of independent rights and denial to access of uncensored or free media is unified 
opposition. The former prison guard remarked, “the suffering is getting worse but the people 
have to show their opposition otherwise there is no resolution. They are showing their 
opposition. The fact that half of the population has left the country is the evidence.”116 If the 
testimonies above fail to prove the suppressive climate of media and personal liberties in Eritrea, 
then one could also turn to the international surveillance that has arisen in the aftermath of 
President Afewerki’s decision to ban investigative journalists and outside civil society.  
 According to reports made by Amnesty International, the detained prisoners of 
consciousness have been detained in Eritrea’s conspicuous confinements without any official 
charges or scheduled trials.117 The imprisonment of the ten journalists who assisted in publishing 
                                                114	“Eritrea:	Ten	Years	of	Torture	–	An	Eritrean	ex-prison	guard	remembers,”	2011.	Human	Rights	Concern	Eritrea,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://hrc-eritrea.org/391/.	115	“Eritrea:	Ten	Years	of	Torture.”	116	“Eritrea:	Ten	Years	of	Torture.”	117	“Eritrea:	Immediately	and	unconditionally	release	prisoners	of	conscience,”	2016.	Amnesty	International,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eritrea-immediately-and-unconditionally-release-prisoners-of-conscience/	
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the politicians’ open letter in 2001 has increased to 21 journalists by 2016.118 As of 2016, four of 
the journalists have been reported as dying in detention.119 The gravity of these arrests and 
subsequent deaths are symbolic of the gross suppression of private and free media in Eritrea. 
When any group of citizens share a political opinion contrary to that of the head of the state, they 
may be charged with treason or detained without any charges.120 This leads to an overwhelming 
fear amongst those living within the country that are unable to voice political opinions in public, 
unlike the diaspora who do not face immediate reprimanding or repercussions.  
 The government’s stronghold is virtually impenetrable through its grip over personal 
liberties that span past liberties. According to Amanda Poole, “The Eritrean state has maintained 
tight control over civil society and the actions of foreign-aid and development organizations.”121 
There is a slue of scholarship detailing the methods of instilling fear that is associated with 
Eritrea’s authoritarian regime. This is oddly reminiscent of the fear held by Eritreans during the 
1961-1991guerilla warfare, when Eritrean spies lived amongst the population and reported any 
members of dissidence to the Ethiopian regime. Two Eritrean refugees in Switzerland described 
the levels of fear when discussing politics within Eritrea. They reported, “You cannot speak 
about politics in Eritrea, even within your own family circle.”122 This is a commonly shared 
consensus of the self-censorship that Eritreans experience daily inside the country. It is on these 
contingencies that Eritrea has been consistently characterized as a prison state by the media.123 
Suppression in the Form of Religion: 
                                                
118 “2014 prison census – Eritrea” 2014. Refworld, accessed April 26, 2017, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/549804de19.html  
119 “Three journalists held since 2001 die in Eiraeiro prison camp,” 2012. Reporters without Borders, accessed April 
26, 2017, http://en.rsf.org/eritrea-three-journalists-held-since-2001-30-08-2012,43298.html. 120	“2014	prison	census.”	121	Poole,	Amanda.	2013.	"Ransoms,	Remittances,	and	Refugees:	The	Gatekeeper	State	in	Eritrea."	Africa	
Today	no.	2:	66.	122	Bozzini,	“The	Fines	and	the	Spies.”	32-49.	123	Rice,	Xan.	2009.	“Eritrea	‘Like	a	Giant	Prison’,	Claims	Human	Rights	Group.”	Guardian,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/16/eritrea-africa-human-rights-refugees.	
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 According to the Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the 
expansion of freedom and democracy around the world, the state of Eritrea is ranked as a 7 on a 
scale of 1-7 (1=best, 7=worst) in civil liberties, political rights and overall freedom.124 This level 
of freedom can best be represented in the limitedness of religiosity. The Freedom House has 
reported that there have only been four faiths recognized by the State of Eritrea since 2002: 
Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Lutheranism as practiced by the 
Evangelical Church of Eritrea. In case the tyrannical repression of religion is unclear or 
ambiguous, one should observe the remainder of religions that have been outlawed in Eritrea and 
the repercussions the devout worshippers face for expressing their religious affiliation. 
According to the Freedom House, “Members of Evangelical and Pentecostal churches face 
persecution, but the most severe treatment is reserved for Jehovah’s Witnesses, who are barred 
from government jobs and refused business permits or identity cards.”125 Jehovah’s Witnesses 
are held to such a brute level of isolation and imprisoned because they refuse to enlist in the 
military service due to their religion. According to the Center on Conscience and War, many 
Jehovah Witnesses refer to Isaiah 2:4 within the scripture that says, “They will have to beat their 
swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning shears. Nation will not lift up sword against 
nation, neither will they learn war any more” (Isaiah 2:4). 126 If a citizen refuses to join a military 
service and the possibility of war, they are unable to fulfill their civic duty in Eritrea. This goes 
against the cultural norm of placing the collective over the individual, which is represented in the 
Nakfa Principles. This does not defend the lack of freedom of religion in Eritrea; however, it 
                                                124	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Eritrea,”	Freedom	House,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/eritrea	125	“Freedom	in	the	World	–	Eritrea.”	126	“Jehovah’s	Witnesses,”	The	Center	on	Conscience	&	War,	accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.centeronconscience.org/component/content/article/49-words-publication/225-jehovahs-witnesses.html.	
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offers an interesting perspective as to why the government may selectively allow certain forms of 
worship over others. In 2013, the United Nations published Sheila Keetharuth’s Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, which contained disclosed 
observations from Eritrean refugees’ experiences in Eritrea. Within her report, Keetharuth writes, 
“Those interviewed reported that the Government interferes in the internal matters of recognized 
religions through controls and invasive policies, including the lack of provisions for exemption 
from military service for conscientious objection.”127 The draconian levels of suppression 
discovered within documents covering human rights injustices like Keetharuth’s report lack 
consistent coverage from the international community, which enable the current situation. The 
fear of religious persecution is yet another motivator for some of those who flee Eritrea in hopes 
of individual freedoms. 
Suppression in the Form of Assembly: 
 The next civil and personal liberty that requires critical evaluation is the right of 
assembly. In many democratic nations, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of 
association can be observed in the form of meetings, protests, etc. These rights are reflected in 
Article 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights128. Despite the 
international law, there are no non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society 
organizations nor independent organizations allowed that are not affiliated with the authorities.129 
One of the main assemblies of Eritreans recognized abroad is the Young People’s Front for 
Democracy and Justice (YPFDJ), which answers directly to the PFDJ and advances the 
                                                127	Keetharuth,	Sheila.	2013.	“Report	of	the	Special	Rapporteur	on	the	Situation	of	Human	Rights	in	Eritrea,”	United	Nations	General	Assembly.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.53_ENG.pdf	128	“International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,”	United	Nations	Human	Rights.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx	129	“International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights.”		
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legitimacy of the government across borders. For a nation without checks or balances, NGOs, 
independent institutions and civil society allow citizens a capacity to keep their governments 
liable to the people’s needs. Ultimately, these institutions reduce corruption by conducting on the 
ground research/fieldwork that shape government policies and development through policy 
recommendations and international coverage of clandestine issues pertinent to advancing or 
improving living conditions and as a result, human rights.  
 By banning these independent institutions, the state of Eritrea is strengthening its label as 
a surveillance state and consequently inciting fear in its people. These conditions have invoked 
thousands of Eritreans to defect, but not all within the country have the ability to flee. This 
leaves the most vulnerable population at a crossroads, to continue life within the perimeters of 
Eritrea or to flee to the neighboring countries of Sudan or Ethiopia, without certainty of a better 
quality of life. By operating as a state that does not answer to its constituents, Eritrea contradicts 
internationally recognized limitations of power, garnering international attention and sanctions 
when most convenient for world superpowers like the U.S in 2009 in the case of Al-Shabaab130. 
These untimely restrictions fuel the regime’s hold on its locals and diaspora, defending the need 
for securitization while simultaneously promoting the “us vs. them”131 narrative. Additionally, it 
provides momentary lapses of validation to government supporters in the diaspora communities 
that promote the government’s need to stronghold the nation. Although these views are widely 
accepted by members of YPFDJ, they do not encapsulate the slue of ongoing criticisms voiced 
                                                130	“Security	Council	Imposes	Sanctions	on	Eritrea	over	its	Role	in	Somalia,	Refusal	to	Withdraw	Troops	Following	Conflict	with	Djibouti,”	2009.	United	Nations.	Accessed	April	26,	2017,	https://www.un.org/press/en/2009/sc9833.doc.htm	131	During	the	liberation	war,	global	powers	supported	Ethiopia	with	weapons	and	resources,	which	made	the	30	years	war	(1961-1991)	especially	grueling	due	to	the	lack	of	support.	Post-liberation	and	through	its	Nakfa	Principles,	the	state	of	Eritrea	has	maintained	its	self-reliant	narrative	and	has	limited	allies	in	the	international	communities	as	well	as	its	acceptance	of	foreign	aid.	“Us	vs.	them”	depicts	the	framework	that	has	arisen	prior	to	liberation	and	remains	post-liberation	that	the	international	community	is	not	concerned	with	the	survival	of	the	nation	or	its	people.	There	is	a	national	pride	and	unity	that	is	attributed	to	being	Eritrean	because	the	nation	attained	independence	‘Against	All	Odds’	(which	became	the	slogan	of	the	war).	
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by the crusaders of justice and human rights like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
and individual activists, hoping to expose violations of liberties and investigate the widespread 
fear. Eritrean communities worldwide are split between those who support the regime and 
identify as Shabait,132 and those who oppose the regime – many who often remain silent to avoid 
being deemed a traitor or worse, ‘Weyane’133.  Within Eritrea, there is no opposition 
community or collective of dissidents as present in the diaspora. Those that oppose the 
government do so in silence because of the widespread fear of covert reporters in plain sight. The 
next medium of suppression necessary to critique is the challenges deserters’ families face in 
government discovery of draft evaders and defectors. Through this method, the ways in which 
fear transpires and exacerbates the reign of the government and the generational distrust that 
arises in response. 
Suppression in the Form of Punishing Deserters’ Families: 
 The 2001 crackdown on Eritrea’s free press combined with the 2002 Warsay-Yikaelo 
Campaign fueled the mass exodus of Eritrean peoples that soon realized conscription would 
extend far past its 18-month promise. There are no official policies that denote the punishment of 
those related to defectors or draft evaders; however, the spread of rumors, allegations, and forced 
remittances have led locals and scholars to associate the consequences that remain with the 
deserters’ families. In fact, Bozzini writes about the state in Eritrea between 2005-2012, “A new 
and unforeseen repressive measure was introduced whereby the police took into custody parents 
                                                132	During	the	liberation	war,	the	members	of	the	ELF	were	Jebha	and	the	EPLF	were	Shabait.	As	the	state	of	Eritrea	was	founded	through	the	EPLF	that	transformed	into	PFDJ,	Shabait	has	been	upheld	as	those	in	favor	of	the	government.	Shabait,	which	means	the	people	in	the	masses	in	Tigrinya,	has	origins	in	Arabic	(sha’ab).		133	When	used	in	reference	to	an	Eritrean	(instead	of	an	Ethiopian),	Weyane	is	a	derogatory	term	because	it	distinguishes	the	Ethiopian	(Tigray)	forces	that	have	historically	posed	a	threat	to	the	livelihood	of	Eritreans.	To	call	an	Eritrean	‘Weyane’	is	to	denounce	his	or	her	identity	and	right	to	claiming	the	liberation	that	has	affected	every	Eritrean	family.	
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whose children were alleged to have defected from the national service.”134 This was not the only 
method of punishment that families faced. In many cases, there were additional taxes levied 
against families, many whom already lacked the capacity to sustain themselves. “Paying off 
50,000 Nakfa to the local administration was the sine qua non condition for releasing a family 
member from custody.”135 With an informal and inconsistent practice of penalization, 
punishment became open to speculation and rumors within the public. The austerity has been 
normalized, leaving little to no alternatives to obeying fines or punishments and abiding by the 
status quo. 
Fear, Generational Distrust and Dissent: 
 Speculation and rumors have a grave impact on the Eritrean locals and diaspora because 
they allow the government’s reign to surpass concrete legal declarations and policies, 
unintentionally granting it an omnipresent presence. The legitimacy and jurisdiction of the 
administration becomes fluid because the authorities’ wield is distorted by imagination or rumors 
that stems from exacerbating pre-existing fears.136 This is not to invalidate the fears and lived 
experiences of Eritreans that must flee to survive, yet it aims to showcase how pervasive the grip 
of the government and its instruments of fear that have seeped into communities locally and 
overseas. Furthermore, the inability to confirm the root of suspicions and penalties amongst 
dissenters, deserters’ families, and those unfairly imprisoned has led to distrust socially. 
“Accurate or not, such interpretations caused social ruptures among fellow citizens by supporting 
the idea that the state could intrude into personal relation.”137 How can Eritreans fully engage in 
their communities while filtering any speech that can be interpreted or morphed into opposition 
                                                134	Bozzini,	“The	Fines	and	the	Spies.”	32-49.	135	Bozzini,	“The	Fines	and	the	Spies.”	32-49.	136	Bozzini,	“The	Fines	and	the	Spies.”	32-49.	137	Bozzini,	“The	Fines	and	the	Spies.”	32-49.	
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sentiments? How can a citizen offer criticism and hold his or her government accountable if 
there are understood repercussions to voicing unpopular opinions? There is a level of 
helplessness followed by submissiveness that evolves with suppression that infiltrates multiple 
sectors of everyday life.  
  In its local context, Eritreans are unable to mobilize for a plethora of inhibitors, not 
limited to the aforementioned lack of freedoms of press, religion and assembly. Fear is one of the 
most powerful deterrents that international relations scholars have proven through examples in 
game theory such as the prisoner’s dilemma138. With a population entrenched in fear, stagnation 
is the safer alternative to mobilizing a public meeting of dissent when unrestricted assembly is 
outlawed.  Similar behavior applies to publicly expressing disdain towards authorities or 
governance.  
 Abroad, Eritreans who wish to hold citizenship, own property and travel freely upon 
return to Eritrea must submit remittances in the form of the infamous 2 percent tax, which the 
government relies heavily on. In fact, Bozzini reports, “Channeling hard currency from the 
Eritreans in the diaspora, who are increasingly refusing to support the state, is certainly one of 
the current challenges that the Eritrean leadership is facing.”139 Despite the resistance with the 
diaspora tax, some Eritreans abroad resist speaking negatively of the regime in public gatherings 
because of the risk of covert surveillance. Poole writes, “The tax on Eritreans living abroad is 
technically voluntary…however, refusal to pay this tax can have consequences for individuals 
abroad and their families in Eritrea.”140 So while many can evade the tax as expatriates, those 
with family living within the country or hoping to visit their homeland must comply with 
                                                138	Barclay,	Pat,	and	Nichola	Raihani.	2016.	"Partner	choice	versus	punishment	in	human	Prisoner’s	Dilemmas."	Evolution	And	Human	Behavior	37,	no.	4:	263-271.	139	Barclat	and	Raihini,	“Partner	Choice	versus	Punishment.”	263-271.	140	Poole,	"Ransoms,	Remittances,	and	Refugees.”	66.	
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remittances to possess visas to enter and exit, purchase and maintain land, and reap the benefits 
of an Eritrean citizen. 
 The majority of dissenters, similar to the activists in the Arab Spring, are composed of 
the youth. The youth abroad that refuse the 2 percent tax can be interpreted as an act of rebellion 
against the state. The youth of the Eritrean diaspora lack the stoicism of the liberation generation, 
one of the greatest factors of the generational divide. The Eritrean youth within the country 
defect as a means of opposing the state through placing the needs of the individual above the 
existing culture of sacrificing one’s self or one’s comfort to compromise for the good of the 
collective. Poole reports, “Recent escapees are treated as criminals if voluntarily repatriated to 
the country, facing imprisonment and sometimes torture.”141 The remainder of Eritrean youth is 
absorbed in national service and civil reconstructive positions assigned during conscription. 
There is an immediate luxury that Eritreans in the diaspora harbor; the ability to critique and 
express opinions of the government in a public forum without risk of immediate physical harm.  
 In Tunisia, the immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi was broadcasted through the media and 
rapidly garnered international recognition through its visceral feeling of shock and sympathy. In 
Egypt, the thousands of protestors in Tahrir Square communicated in masses through instant 
communication via Facebook, Twitter and other forums of social media to organize and warn 
protestors. In Yemen and Syria, news outlets like Al-Jazeera and other independently operated 
press provided coverage during the ongoing civil wars. It is vital to recognize the level of access 
to communication, lack of implementation of (indefinite) conscription, and the disparities in 
resources accessible to the participants of the Arab Spring versus the people within Eritrea. The 
argument is not which country had it worse, rather what factors are responsible for delaying 
uprisings in Eritrea when it faces countless similarities as its regional Arab counterparts that 
                                                141	Poole,	"Ransoms,	Remittances,	and	Refugees.”	66.	
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were affected by the Arab uprisings. The presence of an authoritarian regime, lack of good 
governance, restricted civil liberties, and desire for democracy alone are not always sufficient in 
resulting in a change in government or civil unrest, as reflected in the current state of Eritrea. 
 In order for a revolution to take place in Eritrea, similar to the Arab Spring, those 
speaking out against the injustices must be the local Eritreans. The Egyptian diaspora in the US 
did not protest the government and set demands, nor did the Tunisian diaspora or any other Arab 
diaspora – the oppressed groups within each respective nation mobilized and united in the midst 
of crisis. The cries of Eritrean diaspora that were not born in Eritrea are often the only voices 
given to the people, unintentionally overpowering the focus given to the local inhabitants. How 
can we tell a story we have not lived through? There is a membership group for Eritreans abroad 
that support the government, YPFDJ, but there are no other organized membership for those that 
raise critiques or opposition. Although the current government would not easily accept an 
opposition group, there could be an attempt to remain involved and enact change in the form of 
non-political organizations. These non-political organizations could be dedicated to education, 
access to resources, and the vast adversities disregarded and underfunded issues prevalent within 
Eritrea.  
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Conclusion 
 How does a country’s population decide to rebel? What conditions push citizens to their 
breaking point? How long can one man rule before the people demand a change? What can be 
said in the case of Eritrea when compared to the Arab Spring? To synthesize what has been 
discussed through these chapters, one should review the primary factors of the Arab Spring, the 
relevance of conscription in both the Arab Spring and Eritrea, as well as how the state of Eritrea 
has constructed itself in the international community and amongst its citizens at home and in the 
diaspora. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to consider the input of scholarship towards what 
would have needed to arise in Eritrea to reach its regional counterparts and what policy 
recommendations the regime and the people could implement moving forward. 
 The Arab Spring varied within each of the twelve nations it affected the most, yet each 
respective nation’s population had common vehicles of dissemination (social media, independent 
press, etc.) as well as the physical capacity to mobilize its citizens, especially the youth which 
composed the majority of the nations involved. The culmination of declining economic 
conditions, authoritarian regimes, censored media, tribal conflicts, disenfranchisement of 
religious minorities, unemployment, and poverty were key factors in the revolutions and 
organized protests that reached North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. No two countries 
experienced the same uprising; however, there was a unifying presence amongst the people that 
at the very least led to government changes if not protests. In the countries whose populations 
did not succeed in revolting against the authoritarian rulers in place, the government used tactics 
to suppress its dissidents, whether through passing appeasing legislation like in the cases of the 
wealthier states of Algeria, Oman, Jordan, and Kuwait, or through cooperating with similar 
regimes, which was visible of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where the former converted the crisis in 
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Bahrain into a regional instability. In the case of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the need to end the 
cycle of authoritarian rulers, corruption, discrimination, and poverty reached unbearable levels 
and sparked mass dissidence. Behind the unrest of civil war in Yemen and Syria, the countries 
within North Africa experienced some of the most gruesome responses from the militarized 
authorities but they did not deter the efforts of the Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans. The shared 
goal of attaining freedom, equality, and justice for those continuously neglected by the 
government fueled the resistance and eventual prevail/triumph.  
 During the liberation war, Eritreans shared the same vision of attaining freedom, equality 
and justice in the form of a sovereign Eritrea, free from the reign of Western colonizers, imperial 
forces and its long-standing neighbor/enemy Ethiopia. Two decades after the fighting and the 
EPLF has transformed into a monolithic apparatus in the form of the PFDJ, the only allowed 
political state within the nation. Within this time frame leading up to the Arab Spring, Eritrea had 
regularly conscripted civilians at the age of 18, yet terms of service had surpassed initial 
promises. Although the rest of the countries in North Africa also had obligatory forms of 
conscription, no country held nearly as restrictive confinements with a lack of sustainability or 
opportunity to revisit the public sector post-service. Unlike its regional counterparts, Eritrea’s 
government created a calculated system in which Eritrea’s youth would have to complete their 
final year of post secondary education in a far removed location, normalizing conscription as a 
necessary aspect of service to one’s country. Although Eritrea’s populations pales in comparison 
to its Arab-speaking neighbors, it has had the most success in subscribing its citizens into life-
long reconstructive assignments and triggering a refugee exodus from those who wish to have a 
life outside of stoicism.  
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 The Arab Uprisings and those who flee Eritrea share traits of resisting authoritarian rulers 
with omnipotent capacities within their borders. With respect to Eritrea, flight is a direct 
response to suppression of civil and individual liberties, not limited to religion, press and media, 
assembly, expression and conscription. In a nation unaccountable to its constituents, those in 
Eritrea are subject to the mercy of authorities and live in fear of clandestine or covert groups 
incognito. Comparatively, suppression of foreign media and lack of secularism were present in 
the Arab nations that experienced political and social upheaval. The main difference between the 
countries that successfully took to the streets versus Eritrea is the physical capacity of those with 
a lack of individual rights to protest the only government to exist post-liberation. 
 First and foremost, the political structures of governance within Eritrea require 
constructive evaluation. The border war is no longer active and the need for mobilized military 
efforts has severely declined. In order to restore faith and due diligence within the Eritrean 
people, the country’s officials must cater to the needs of the immediate persons it aims to serve. 
The purpose of the government is to maintain order and security within its populous, but with 
ongoing repression in the form of national service, the nation’s population is drastically 
reducing. If at least 5,000 Eritreans are fleeing their homes every month, there is an interpreted 
imminent danger sparking their departures.  
 In a country that lacks sustainability, consistent electricity, significant foreign aid to 
stimulate economic progression, developed rural areas, as well as a government that strongholds 
its citizens, it is difficult to articulate what would have been needed to achieve similar levels of 
success as its Arab regional counterparts. Eritrea was involved in a bloody war barely a decade 
before the Arab Uprisings. Eritrean citizens had grown exhausted by the ongoing conflicts with 
Ethiopia and the growth of casualties and unrest. History and border disputes allowed President 
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Isaias Afewerki to construct an existential threat that put Eritrea at risk. These grievances led to 
the implementation of the Warsay Yikaelo Campaign in 2002, which is responsible for the 
ongoing mobilization of Eritrean conscripts.  
 After reviewing the current conditions in Eritrea, there are a few alterations that could 
benefit the people of Eritrea and its diaspora communities. There has not been a free or fair 
election, or any election for that matter, since the U.N. supervised referendum in 1993. Not only 
are elections within the nation overdue, but the stronghold invested in unitary political party 
must be revised. Without an alternative to the head of the state, the international community 
recognizes extended leadership as a dictatorship or authoritarian regime, which damages the 
level of cooperation and economic opportunity available from the international community. 
There must be an end to indefinite conscription; openness to political discourse; investment in 
education; and access to sustainable resources and subsidies provided to those in rural and poorer 
areas. Not only are there needs economically to bolster the state of the country, but there are 
needs for reform where current suppression exists. Without independent media, the government 
damages its own credibility and draws attention to the secretive structures within the parameters 
of Eritrea. Additionally, the freedom of religion is a human right that should not be dictated by a 
governing power. One’s religious beliefs are able to be separate from political and economic 
policies. Fear and the inability to mobilize disqualified Eritreans from being able to participate in 
the Arab Spring as the Eritrean government’s restrictiveness on its people made rebellion seem 
incomprehensible.  
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